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A Correlational Study to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Behavior-Based Safety                            
in an Offshore Oil Production Facility 
                                                         Zinga Martine Branco 
      
For many countries, oil production constitutes a large part of their economic resources. It 
is also one of the most hazardous activities with high incident rates. Workplace safety has 
remained a challenge for these industries which strive to operate injury free. Behavior-Based 
Safety (BBS) is used as a safety intervention approach to minimize the frequency and severity of 
workplace incidents and injuries. Many companies assume BBS is effective in reducing injuries 
and losses. However, only anecdotal evidence is usually presented to support the effectiveness of 
BBS in decreasing incident rates. 
This study explores the relationship between Behavior–Based Safety (BBS) outcomes and 
incident rates in an oil production offshore facility located in West Africa. Quantitative analyses 
were performed using company historical data during a period of five years. Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients were calculated. Significant relationships (p value < 0.05) were 
found in correlation analyses between the rates of unsafe behaviors and total incidents; safe 
behaviors and total incidents; and observations sessions and total incidents. Linear regression 
models were used to assess the predictability of incident rates from BBS outcomes. These 
models revealed that only about three to nine percent of the variances in total incident rates could 
be explained by BBS outcomes, suggesting the existence of other organizational factors 
impacting incident rates’ variations. 
These findings suggested that BBS process could improve safety-related behaviors in 
workplaces; however, it had little effect on incident rates because BBS process outcomes were 
not good predictors of incident rates. Therefore, companies should not focus on BBS alone to 
decrease incident rates. Other safety programs should be given attention and resources allocated 
into BBS activities should be reconsidered. Further research is recommended to explore causal 
relationships of the significant correlations and to investigate the effects of BBS on incident rates 
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Definitions and Terms 
 
• ANOVA: Analysis of Variance. 
• At- Risk behaviors: Unsafe work practice in a facility (Krause, 1995). 
• BBS: Behavior-Based Safety is an employee-driven process that consists of changing 
workers’ safety-related behaviors (Krause, 1995). 
• Incident: Any unplanned event resulting in a loss whether injuries occur or not. For the 
purpose of this study, accidents and incidents will be used interchangeably (Brauer, 2006, 
p.23). 
• Incident rates: A U.S. standardized measurement computed by multiplying the number of 
injuries (incidents) by 200,000 and then dividing the result by the total hours worked 
(Petersen, 2003). 
•  Intervention Effectiveness: Consists of determining whether a safety initiative has had 
the intended effect (Robson et al., 2001). 
• Leading indicators: Leading metrics typically representing self-assessment ratings of a 
company's exposure to safety hazards (Wurzelbacher & Jin, 2011). 
• NIOSH: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 






• Summative Evaluation: Same as effectiveness evaluation. That is, did the intervention 
work in terms of impact on the dependent variable? (Robson et al., 2001). 
• Trailing Indicators: typically measures the frequency and severity of past injuries/ 
illnesses, such as injury rates and worker compensation costs. These types of metrics are 







                                    Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 Behavior-Based Safety (BBS) has become very popular as a proactive safety intervention 
approach to deterring workplace incidents and injuries in the last two decades. Many industries 
around the world are investing tremendous resources to implement and sustain BBS processes in 
the workplace. Some scholars also consider BBS process outcomes as important indicators of 
organizational safety performance. However, little has been done to establish the effectiveness or 
impact of this process in lowering incident rates in workplace settings. In many of these 
organizations there is competition for financial resources which are usually limited. However, it 
appears that many safety consulting companies, who usually design these behavioral safety 
processes, overly inflate the potential of BBS to decrease incident rates by presenting evidences 
which are merely anecdotal. Therefore, it becomes important to empirically clarify whether or 
not these companies are buying into an unproven concept.  
XYZ Oil Company has applied different approaches in order to decrease incident rates and 
to sustain an injury-free operation culture. A little more than a decade ago, the company adopted 
BBS as a proactive safety process in their safety system. It is strongly believed that the 
company’s safety performance improved due to the implementation of the BBS process, which, 
since then, has been given far more attention than other loss prevention strategies. Substantial 
resources have been put into this process. However, while there are indications of XYZ Oil 
Company’s safety performance improvement, the relationship between BBS activities and the 





between BBS process outcomes and incident rates in order to establish whether its attributed 
impact on incident rates is a mere perception or a fact.   
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
The aim of this study is not to analyze functional elements of Behavioral-Based Safety 
process or to assess their applicability; such types of studies have been extensively featured in 
the safety literature and are generally performed during the development and implementation 
phases of BBS which are precursors to the effectiveness evaluation which is the concern of this 
study. The objective of this work is to explore the effect of BBS interventions in a realistic 
setting by using final performance outcomes measurement such as incident rates. Sometimes 
referred to as summative evaluation, effectiveness evaluations need to be systematically done 
because they are generally more useful than other types of evaluations (LaMontagne 
&Needleman, 1996).  
A large portion of BBS effectiveness studies published in the safety literature has used 
proxy-outcomes or substitutes for incident and injury rates. One reason given is that the typical 
low frequency of major and recordable incidents and injuries in the workplace may lessen the 
study’s power. Additionally, possible unreliability of an organization’s incident tracking systems 
was also mentioned as one of the concerns (Geller, 1996; Johnston & Hayes, 2005). However, in 
order to establish objectively the effectiveness of an intervention, final outcomes measurements 
such as incident rates should be considered (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000; Hermann et al., 
2010). In addition, the very few studies that have considered final outcomes measurement have 





1.2 Behavior-Based Safety in XYZ Oil Company 
 
Company overview. Located southwest of the African Coast, XYZ Oil Company is a 
subsidiary of a multinational oil company headquartered in the United States. Its activities 
involve exploration, production, shipment of crude oil, gas and other petroleum products. 
Founded in 1956, it has been one of the most successful oil companies in Africa.  XYZ Oil 
Company is divided into many departments; these include Production, Finances, Human 
Resource and Legal, Supply Chain and Health Environment. The company employs more than 
six thousand employees, working in different departments. Oil production is one of the most 
hazardous industrial activities with high incident rates. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2011 report, the incident rate is estimated at 0.9 for 100 full time workers in oil and gas 
explorations. Therefore, promoting safe operations and environmentally sound production is a 
challenge for many oil production companies. 
  In XYZ Oil Company, the production department has experienced a considerable number 
of incidents. In fact, the production department is the most exposed to incidents due to the 
hazardous and complex nature of the production activities performed. In the effort to reduce 
incident rates many safety initiatives have been implemented including slogans, policies, rules, 
safety meetings, safe work practices, safety trainings, process hazard analysis (PHA), incident 
investigations, safety audits and employees’ disciplinary process. While these strategies may 
have contributed to decreasing incidents at one time, they were not effective in sustaining good 
safety performance and ensuring continuous improvement. 
  In 2000, the company implemented Behavior-Based Safety (BBS) as a means to decrease 





efforts were invested into training people and applying BBS concepts. After more than a decade 
of implementation, XYZ Oil Company’s safety performance has been better at least anecdotally, 
and it is believed that BBS has helped in decreasing the number of incidents. The average 
workers in this company spend about 15 minutes/day participating in BBS processes. 
Considering the 6,000 workers involved with this process, the man-power needed is substantial. 
Therefore, it is worth questioning how well this process is working and how to measure its 
effectiveness. Is it just that people have bought into to an unproved concept or is BBS’s impact 
on accident rates a fact? This study considers a correlational approach to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Behavior-Based Safety process within the XYZ Oil Company by using a 
statistical analysis of the company’s historical data.  
Behavior–Based Safety description. Organizational behavior analysis has been around 
for a century, beginning with Frederick Taylor in the late 1800s. However, it became industry- 
oriented and based on principles of operant conditioning about three decades ago under the 
proprietary name of Behavior Science Technology (BST). Nonetheless, the term Behavior-Based 
Safety (BBS) was coined by Dr. Scott Geller (Petersen, 2003; Krause, 1995). The BBS process 
consists of observing workers’ behaviors while performing their tasks and giving constructive 
feedback to them. A sample of critical behaviors to be observed is included in Appendix D.  
Feedback is the core of the whole observation activity; it is a friendly peer to peer discussion 
about specific safe and risky behaviors observed. The result of the conversation is captured in 
writing on an observation worksheet especially designed for this process. A sample of 





  While it can be adapted to fit specific companies’ needs, BBS principles remain founded 
on the “ABC” analysis (Geller, 2005). This consists of identifying the antecedents (A) to targeted 
behaviors (B) and applying either encouraging or deterring consequences (C). In the BBS 
process, it is believed that consequences drive behaviors while antecedents influence behaviors. 
Consequences may be classified into two main categories: positive reinforcements, which consist 
of giving stimulus (verbal reinforcement for example) in order to encourage safe behaviors, and 
negative reinforcements, which consist of removing a stimulus in order to discourage risky 
behaviors. 
Conceptual Framework of BBS Process in XYZ.  The BBS process at XYZ Oil 
Company follows the corporation design from the United States. It consists of observing people 
while carrying out their daily activities and requires that feedback between observers and 
observees occur objectively and promptly. The most important thing is to capture what drives 
specific behaviors in order to correct (when risky) or repeat them (when safe). In order to 
complete an observation, users must go through the following steps: ask permission, perform 
observation, provide/lead feedback and collect information in writing to be input into the 
organization’s database. A typical BBS observation generally should take about 10-15 minutes 
(Cooper & Philips, 2004). On a by-weekly basis, a specific team of employees, called a Steering 
Committee, will analyze the information provided, update the team on performance and come up 
with corrective actions to address any opportunity that may arise. In addition, a BBS champion is 
elected to lead friendly BBS competitions among teams on a monthly basis. It is important to 
note that this process is employee-driven where punishment and repercussions for reported 





However, as in any other safety intervention process, BBS needs management support in order to 
be successful. XYZ‘s BBS conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 0.1: XYZ Oil Company’s BBS Framework Summarized for this Study. 
The conceptual theory supported Behavior–Based Safety process is presented in chapter two. 
This chapter also reviews the injuries and prevention strategies as well as BBS effectiveness 
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                                    Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 2.1 Concepts and Theories 
 
This literature review provides a background into occupational accident prevention 
approaches in terms of their history and both traditional and progressive perspectives. Primarily, 
the underlying theories and concepts relevant to occupational accidents and prevention strategies 
are explored here. Second, the conceptual framework of BBS process design is analyzed here in 
order to understand the dynamic in which BBS is supposed to work and empirical evidences 
supporting this framework in the safety literature are also extensively reviewed.  
History of accident prevention programs. In the early 1800’s, employers were little 
concerned with worker’s safety (Goetsch, 2008). With the industrial development in the United 
States, occupational casualties increased due to new manufacturing technologies and man-power 
demographic changes. Much later, these events, in addition to labor shortage due to World War 
II deployments, raised serious concerns for worker safety which then became the subject of 
much higher interest than in early decades (Goetsch, 2008).  However, “the advent of organized 
industrial safety programs is accredited to the Pittsburgh Survey” (Petersen, 2003) which was 
performed by the Russell Sage Foundation and published in 1907. This survey revealed that 
work related incidents claimed 562 lives and 500 serious and permanent disabilities per year in a 
single county (Petersen, 2003). In 1916, industrial safety programs were modeled by the 
American Occupational Medical Association to include occupational health.    
Accident causation theories. In the early 1900s occupational accidents were generally 





challenged by Sidney Williams in his Industrial Safety Manual (1927), where he claimed that 
accidents were predictable events which can be prevented (Petersen, 2003; Kidd P. et al., 2003). 
Thus, in an effort to prevent workplace incidents, safety and health practitioners focused on 
uncovering their causes. Many theories of accident causations were then proposed and some of 
them have framed modern accident prevention approaches. They include Heinrich’s Domino 
theory and axioms, human factor theory, Petersen theory and behavioral theory, among the most 
notable. 
  H.W. Heinrich’s Domino theory of accidents suggested that there are five factors in a 
chain reaction ending up in accidents (Petersen, 2003). In his axioms, Heinrich claimed that 
unsafe acts constitute 88 per cent of causes of accidents while ten per cent are caused by unsafe 
conditions and the remaining two per cent are attributed to unrecognized causes (Heinrich, 1931; 
Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos, 1980). He also proposed the concept of the 3 E’s of safety which are 
engineering, education, and enforcement. Many modern injury prevention approaches are based 
on Heinrich’s works. 
 Heinrich’s accident causation theory was later challenged by more comprehensive views 
of accident causations; the most relevant is the multiple causations theory, which held that 
accidents are seldom a matter of a single cause. Rather, many causes and sub-causes may 
contribute together in order for an accident to happen. These contributing factors were grouped 
into two main categories which involve human and environmental factors. A typical accident 
causation model evolved from this theory is the Reason’s accident causation model                            





contributing factors to incidents deviating from the common pathway to incidents. What he 
called “the latent condition’s pathways.” The model is pictured in Figure 2.1. 
                                                          
Figure 0.1: Modified Reason’s Accident Causation Model  (Source, Hopkins, 2006, p. 9). 
2.2 Injuries Prevention Approaches 
2.2.1 Traditional Approaches to Incident Preventions.  
Traditional incident prevention approaches were mainly design and administrative oriented, with 
little to no emphasis on human factors. The 3 E’s of safety have been the core of early safety 
programs which hold that incidents can be addressed by engineering, education and enforcement. 
Advocates of this approach believed that process hazards can be eliminated through engineering 
design; then, through education, safe work practices could be inculcated to workers and safety 
expectations emphasized. Finally, through enforcement organizations may ensure that safety 
policies, procedures, rules and regulations are in place and followed accordingly. Another 
relevant concept of traditional incident prevention approaches is the hierarchy of controls, so-





typical model of controls suggested by NIOSH (2010) includes elimination, substitution, 
engineering controls, administrative controls and finally, personal protective equipment (PPE). 
2.2.2 The Shift in Incident Preventions Approaches.   
From top-down management to broad participation approaches, early safety intervention 
approaches were mostly driven by management and disseminated to the workers. Despite some 
safety improvement accredited to these management-driven approaches, performance 
sustainability was hardly achieved because these interventions were less likely to get employee 
commitment. Thus, the need for employee’s participative approaches became evident (Paul 
&Maiti, 2007). This was illustrated by the work of Neal and Griffin (2006) that examined the 
effects of top-down and bottom-up safety processes on safety performance. The study concluded 
that sustainable improvement in workers’ safety behaviors was associated with incident 
reduction in bottom-up processes. Consequently, worker commitment becomes paramount in 
safety interventions. The idea of broad participation in safety interventions emerged from total 
quality management (TQM) strategies introduced by Edward Deming in 1982 (Brauer, 2006; 
Carder & Ragan, 2003). The TQM approach sought to improve process quality through the 
participation of every layer of the organization (Brauer, 2006). This approach shifted the 







From Anecdotal to Scientific Evidence. With TQM, scientific approaches to process 
improvement were also introduced. TQM methods focus on reducing error rates by identifying 
opportunities for improvement and correcting them before the finished products. These methods 
are known to have influenced modern safety performance management. The argument was that if 
safety can be regarded as a process characteristic similar to quality, then similar techniques can 
be applied (Carder, 1994; Carder & Ragan, 1994 & 2003). For instance, TQM methods could be 
applied to intervention strategies such as Behavior-Based Safety “because behaviors can be 
observed, measured and subject to extended statistical analysis techniques” (Weinstein, 1997). In 
the BBS case, incident rates represent error rates, which are regarded as defective products of the 
work process. 
  Scientific methods applied to safety intervention studies have been noticeably featured in 
the safety literature for the last two decades (Chen & Tian, 2012; Carder & Ragan, 1994 & 2003) 
demonstrating the practicability of statistical analysis tools in evaluating safety interventions. 
Similarly, scientific-based evaluative concepts developed in other fields were also applied to 
safety management. For example, Evidence-Based Intervention approaches developed in medical 
fields were applied in safety studies (Shannon et al., 1999). Other studies suggested that the 
Transtheoretical Model of Change (TMC), widely used in other human oriented fields, may be 
used to determine the effectiveness of injury prevention interventions (Kidd et al., 2003; DeJoy, 
1996). 
From trailing to leading indicators. Traditional performance indicators were based on 
trailing factors. For example, at the end of a year, companies usually compare incident rates 
against targeted numbers to establish safety performance. The problem with this approach lies in 





to act. Actually, this is a reactive approach to safety performance and unlikely to sustain injury 
free operation’s goals. The adaptation of TQM methods to safety management helped switch the 
gear from trailing to leading indicators. Consequently, proactive safety interventions such as 
Behavior-Based Safety process, which yield leading indicators, gained popularity. Behavioral 
theorists advocate that eliminating risky (at-risk) behaviors in the workplace may lead to safety 
improvement, and suggested that in order to sustain these improvements, as with TQM, safety 
interventions should be driven by employees. 
2.3 Behavioral Interventions and Other Incident Prevention Approaches  
Behavior-Based Safety and the 3E’s Model. As a widely accepted accident prevention 
approach, the 3E’s model of safety suggests that incidents can be prevented through Education, 
Enforcement and Engineering. However, providing education, engineering and enforcement may 
not necessarily decrease undesirable behaviors (Hart et al., 2009). Consider, for example, how 
many incidents involve removing a machine guard or a very experienced worker taking short 
cuts. Also, the number of fines for exceeding speed limits despite surveillance cameras and 
warning signs could be an illustrative example of the limitations of safety enforcement. (Kidd et 
al. 2003) suggested that knowledge that is not translated into practice has little value. Behavior-
Based Safety process is designed to drive workers into this translation. Numerous studies have 
identified the lack of safe behavioral motivation as a substantial contributor to workers’ unsafe 
acts; this is an important aspect addressed in BBS intervention but not recognized in the 3E’s 
Model. 
BBS and the traditional hierarchy of control. Behavioral interventions can be designed 





Sigurdsson, 2008).  BBS can be involved in many of these control levels. For example, 
observing the use of PPE is usually part of the behaviors sampling process. Likewise, 
components of administrative controls such as safety meetings and management commitment are 
also recorded during BBS observations. As mentioned about the 3E’s model, prevention 
strategies based on the hierarchy of controls alone may not address worker’s unsafe behaviors. In 
fact, most of the protective devices can be easily removed or tampered with. For example, people 
may just choose to bypass a safety device to speed up production or remove their seatbelts while 
driving to feel more comfortable. This usually occurs when the consequences of such risky 
behaviors appear to be more rewarding than the safer ones. Hence, behavior change should 
accompany successful implementation of the hierarchy of controls; this is where the BBS 
process may fit in.  
2.4 Behavioral Interventions and Organizational Behaviors Change 
2.4.1 Motivational theories. 
  
Some studies have associated motivation and change in individual safety behaviors (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006). Popular motivational theories contend that people need to be motivated in order 
to perform well. For example, Maslow’s theory looks at the internal motivators to performance 
via the hierarchy of needs; similarly, Herzberg's theory looks at rewards and recognitions 
associated with one’s work as external motivators, affecting behavior outcomes (Brauer, 2006). 
The well-known Hawthorne Effect suggests that when people know that they are being observed, 
the desired behaviors improve. Another study identified feedback as behavior motivator. All 
these theories, as distinct and complex as they may be, have mostly agreed that people need to be 
motivated in order to perform desired behaviors. BBS may promote both intrinsic and extrinsic 





Behavior-Based Safety as a model of organizational behavioral modification. 
Behavioral-Based Safety interventions derive from the argument that most of the occupational 
incidents are related to unsafe acts and unsafe acts evolve from unsafe behaviors (Paul & Maiti, 
2007; Heinrich, 1931; Wirth & Sigurdsson, 2008). Therefore, focusing on behavior modification 
would address workplace incidents. Geller (2005) suggested four basic types of Behavior-Based 
Interventions related to three stages of behavior modification. They are instructional, supportive, 
motivational and self-management interventions and all four are associated with other- directed, 
self-directed and self-motivated behaviors stages of change. 
The first type, the instructional intervention, is regarded as an activator, aimed at raising 
worker awareness about the consequences of unsafe behaviors by instructing them on safe work 
practices related to targeted behaviors. Safety training will fit into this category. A supportive 
intervention includes recognitions and feedbacks to support learned safe behaviors, and the idea 
is people like to know that they are doing good things in order to continue doing them. It is a 
path to turning the learned behaviors fluent (Geller, 2005). In Geller’s model of behavior change, 
the two previous interventions are related to other directed behaviors stage of change. The third 
type of behavioral intervention and perhaps the most challenging is motivational. In this 
scenario, workers usually choose to engage in risky behaviors because of perceived benefits. In 
this case, the reinforcement aspect of Behavior-Based approaches in addition to suggested 
incentives and rewards can be used as extrinsic motivators to behavior change. The latter type of 
intervention is associated with the self-directed stage of change.  
A major characteristic of Behavior-Based Safety interventions consists of bringing about 





behaviors, “the employee is constantly self-motivated to act safety” (Geller, 2005). This is the 
last stage of behavior modification where the motivation is actually intrinsic. At this stage, safe 
behaviors become inherent and self-accountability for safety is developed. Understanding the 
association between behavioral interventions and stages of change is relevant to evaluating 
organizational Behaviors-Based interventions. A study performed by Kidd et al. (2003), 
suggested a covariate relationship between the strength of an intervention and the stage of 
change and emphasized the need to observe individual stages of change in response to 
intervention’s inputs when assessing intervention effectiveness. This is an important aspect of 
safety intervention effectiveness research. 
2.5 Safety Intervention Effectiveness Research 
2.5.1 The need for intervention effectiveness research.  
Organizations around the world are investing substantial resources in well-advertised 
modern safety intervention programs. Most of the time, however, these are without solid 
evidence of their effectiveness in realistic conditions. Effectiveness here means their impact on 
work processes. Ineffective safety interventions may lead to waste of resources and in some 
cases they may negatively impact workplaces (Shannon et al., 1999). Hence, intervention 
evaluation studies are invaluable to organizational performance. In addition, results of 
intervention effectiveness studies may serve as guidance in the decision-making process related 
to resource allocation (Haddix et al., 2003); therefore these studies must be subjected to strict 
scientific standards (Wirth and Sigurdsson, 2008).   
Safety Intervention Evaluation Models. The National Institute for Occupational Safety 





the frequency and the severity of incidents” (Dyreborg et al., 2011). NIOSH suggests a four- 
phase model of safety intervention evaluation; they are implementation, development, 
monitoring and effectiveness assessment. Many aspects of the first three phases have been 
substantially studied over the last 30 years. However, research on effectiveness assessments are 
fairly recent and constitute one of the growing research focuses in the area of safety 
interventions.  
Intervention effectiveness assessment can be performed in numerous ways, however it is 
generally outcomes-oriented rather than process focused (Haddix et al., 2003); it seeks to analyze 
whether the goals of the intervention are achieved (McDavid, 2005; Wirth and Sigurdsson, 2008) 
by providing a direct link between the intervention and “the outcomes of interest.”  A review of 
the safety literature suggested that safety interventions may follow three main perspectives. They 
can be performed at organizational, technical and human levels (Dyreborg et al., 2011; Robson 
et al., 2001). Regardless of their orientation, this type of research usually strives to answer the 
following questions: “Does the program work?” and “At what extent it has an impact?” (Komaki 
& Goltz, 2001). Answering these questions requires a systematic impact assessment rather than 
merely assuming that a popular process would normally work. When assessing intervention 
effectiveness, it is critical to select proper methodologies and measurement factors while 
considering the intervention’s objectives (Robson et al., 2001).  For instance, evaluation models 
suitable for compliance-oriented interventions may not be appropriate for behavior-oriented 
interventions simply because behavioral approaches are more complex and more subjective than 





Outcomes measurement factors. Measurement factors generally stem from safety 
performance indicators which can be classified as leading or lagging. The most common ones are 
illustrated in the accidents triangle Figure 2.2. These factors can also be grouped in terms of 
dimensions as individual factors (injuries, first aids, LTA and DAW) and process safety factors 
(fires, spills, toxic releases and property damage) (Skogdalen et al., 2011). Guidance on the 
selection of appropriate measurement factors is scarcely available in the safety literature 
(Shannon et al., 1999; Wirth and Sigurdsson, 2008). However, Wirth and Sigurdsson advised 
that these factors should be sector-specific, objective and easily quantifiable. Measurement 
factors are primarily determined by the intervention’s objectives. In this regard, the review of 
safety literature distinguishes two main tendencies of intervention effectiveness studies. The ones 
that use substitutes for incidents as outcomes measurement and the ones that use incident rates 
directly as outcome measurements. The outcomes measurement commonly used as substitute for 
incident rates include safety climate, culture, saving costs and safety behaviors indexes.  
Substitute Outcomes. Also called proxy outcomes, these are proximate indicators of 
incidents which may lead to indirect evidence of intervention effectiveness. Many researchers in 
occupational safety literature have considered these substitutes. Some of them have explored the 
relationship between Behavior-Based interventions and the change in organizational factors such 
as safety climate (Flin et al., 2000; Mearns, 2009), safety culture and safety leadership. Few 
works have focused on direct and indirect saving costs resulting from BBS interventions. For 
example,( Iyer et al., 2004) studied the relationship between incident rates and “intervention’s 
application rate” defined as the total man-hours invested. Other studies such as Cooper and 
Phillips (2004) used safety indexes (percent safe score) as measures of effectiveness. 





2006) as “the critical mass” in their effectiveness analysis, and this, despite widely accepted 
theories identifying them as a common path to injuries and incidents in general (Heinrich, 1931; 
Wirth and Sigurdsson, 2008).  
However, NIOSH cautioned researchers about the use of these substitutes and suggested 
that if the objective of an intervention is to decrease incident rates; then the latter should 
constitute the outcome measurements unless a causal path to incidents is established (Robson et 
al., 2001). Unfortunately, many studies that had used substitute outcomes measurement have 
failed to provide empirical evidence of a significant correlational link between these substitutes 
and incident rates (Height & Thomas, 2003; Saari, 1994). Additionally, predictive validity is 
hard to establish when using substitutes (Mearns, 2009). Moreover, it should be noted that 
incident rates are still regarded as critical outcomes measurement for safety performance by 
many organizations and regulatory agencies. 
Short-Term Outcomes. Some studies have focused on undesirable events close to 
incidents and regarded as precursors of serious injuries. They are usually called short-term 
outcomes. The typical ones are near- misses and minor injuries. A possible argument is that in 
the traditional safety pyramid, near misses and minor injuries usually precede major injuries 
characterized by low frequency and high severity; therefore, by focusing on incident patterns 
evolving from near-miss and minor injury patterns, major incidents may be prevented because 
these patterns can uncover potential weaknesses involved in the occurrence of major incidents. It 
is important to notice that despite their positions on the safety incidents pyramid, their value as 





On the other hand, major incidents at offshore oil production facilities such as fires, 
explosions and toxic releases are not frequent; these precursors may be useful when evaluating 
interventions’ effectiveness. However, in other types of organizations their use may not be 
practical. Even in the former case, as already mentioned above, a systematic relationship 
between these precursors and the outcomes of interest should be established. Many studies have 
explored the relationship between the near-misses reported and major incidents (Guastello, 1993; 
Jones et al., 1999; Nielsen et al., 2006). Jones et al. (1999) found an increase of reported near- 
misses and minor injuries which resulted in a decrease of lost time accidents (LTA) and major 
injuries in a Danish metal plant.  
Final Outcomes. Final outcome measurements result from the ultimate intervention 
objectives. They are practical outcomes of the intervention establishing direct evidences of 
effectiveness. They are usually trailing indicators listed as elements of organizational safety 
performance. These include incident and injury rates. In behavioral safety literature, non-survey 
based intervention studies considering these factors as outcomes measurements are scarce. 
(Haight et al., 2007) appears to be a unique study of this kind. It explored the variation of 
incident rates as dependent variables in response to behavioral safety outcomes as independent 
variables. The accident’s triangle in Figure 2.2 illustrates the dynamic between the different 





        
Figure 0.2: Accident Triangle Modified from Krause, 1995 
 
Evaluation methodologies. As mentioned above, selecting a proper methodology is critical 
when performing intervention evaluation studies. In the safety literature, this type of research has 
taken multiple directions, however the methodology used can be quantitative, qualitative or 
mixed.  Qualitative analyses are generally used for descriptive purposes whereas quantitative 
analyses are more useful in intervention effectiveness studies because they determine the nature 
of the correlation between the intervention inputs and performance outcomes and can also be 
used for performance trending and forecasting (Janicak, 2003). BBS evaluation research featured 
in the safety literature usually involves experiment design, survey questionnaires and statistical 
models. 
 Experimental design. Generally, research based on experiments is more relevant and 
favored. However, in some cases, experiments may not be possible due to legal, ethical and 
organizational reasons. In other cases, intervention effectiveness assessment based on experiment 
may not be feasible because pre-intervention data are either non reliable or simply nonexistent.   
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oftentimes the case in high hazards organizations with long term BBS history such as XYZ Oil 
Company. 
Survey-based design. Much BBS intervention effectiveness research featured in the safety 
literature is survey-based. For example, safety perception surveys (SPS) are widely used to 
assess safety interventions. While these works may involve some data analysis, their results are 
not objectively determined because they involve perception-based evidence. For example, BBS 
evaluation based on surveys actually “measures the level of participant’s satisfaction” and how 
they perceive the intervention impact on incident rates (Fullarton &Stokes, 2006). Quantifying 
the effectiveness of safety interventions such as BBS involves applying statistic on numerical 
data (Fullarton &Stokes, 2006 ; Haight and Thomas, 2003). These data should include both 
intervention and performance outcomes. In addition, survey methods were not validated as a 
good instrument to predict work place incident rates (Wirth and Sigurdsson, 2008; Fullarton & 
Stokes, 2006).  
Statistical models. Safety and health programs may be hard to quantify and their 
effectiveness difficult to measure by survey methods. One way to achieve this is to use statistical 
models because they generally quantify output variation in response to input applications       
(Iyer et al., 2004). These models usually include mathematical relationships and provide 
quantifiable objective evidences. In addition, they allow for making predictions useful to guide 
decision-making processes (Haddix et al., 2003). One of the very rare studies that used 
quantitative supported evidence to establish the relationship between BBS outcomes as 
independent variables and incident rates as dependent variables was performed by (Haight et al., 





the extent at which the intervention works can be determined. The study concluded that there 
was no significant relationship between BBS and incident rates.  
 2.5.2 A Theoretical Analysis of Behavior-Based Safety Effectiveness.  
Assessing the effectiveness of Behavior-Based Safety involves answering the two core questions 
of any intervention effectiveness study mentioned above. The intent of BBS intervention in the 
workplace is to decrease incident rates by increasing safe behaviors and decreasing at-risk 
behaviors. This functional statement identifies the process by which the program is supposed to 
work. In this context, it becomes relevant to assess the ability of BBS interventions to perform as 
such. As a pre-evaluation study, the core question—does BBS work?—may be answered by 
breaking down this functional statement into its key components and questioning them. This is a 
common tactic used in many theory-driven evaluation approaches (Pawson and Tilley, 2004). 
This perspective led to three theory-based sub questions which constitute the framework of this 
study: a) do BBS interventions increase safe behaviors? b) does increasing safe behaviors 
decrease incident rates?  c) to what extent does BBS process impact incident rates? 
Do Behavior-Based Safety interventions increase safe behaviors? The use of 
behavioral approaches to occupational incident prevention was first recognized in the work of 
(Komaki & Goltz, 2001). Advocates of these approaches contend that Behavior-Based 
interventions may foster safe behaviors in the workplace. A fairly decent number of works 
featured in the safety literature had sought to verify this argument. Many of these studies have 
concluded that the percentage of safe behaviors had increased after behavioral interventions. 
Among them, Figures a study performed by ( Godbey, 2006). In this study, BBS intervention 





the early stage of the intervention, an increase of about 20 per cent of safely performed activities 
was observed in relation to the performance baseline. Similarly, Cooper & Newbold’s (1994) 
study showed an increase in safe behaviors frequency in response to behavioral safety 
interventions in a small manufacturing facility. Also, Cooper’s (2006) study reported a small but 
not statistically significant positive relationship between observation frequency and the rate of 
safe behaviors. Congruently, a study performed by Alvero & Austin (2004) suggested that 
performing BBS observations to a peer changes the observer’s safety-related behaviors as well. 
Reber et al. (1984) explored safety behavior trends after a behavioral intervention was 
applied in a sugar factory plant in the US. The study examined the effect of Behavior-Based 
Safety observations on workers’ performance through “safety score,” defined as the ratio of the 
number of employees observed working completely safely and the number of total employees in 
a department. The study concluded that the safety score of the department improved from a 
baseline of 62 per cent to more than 90 percent. Another study performed by (Chen & Tian, 
2012) concluded that the total safety index (SI), defined as the ratio of safe behaviors observed 
and the total number of observations made, had increased by 10 per cent during 35 weeks of 
BBS experiments in a Chinese construction company. A similar intervention study performed by 
(Saari, 1994) reported that safety indexes in two of the targeted departments had increased from 
70 and 78 percent to 96 and 99 per cent respectively.  
Do increasing safe behaviors decrease incident rates? The proactive merit of BBS 
approaches lies in the fact that unsafe behaviors which occur before accidents are eliminated 
(Godbey, 2006; Krause and Russel, 2004); however, many intervention studies have focused on 





Godbey’s (2006) study, an increase of safe targeted behaviors had a positive impact on incident 
rates; reportedly, the total case incident rates (TCIR) was cut by more than 50 per cent in one of 
the facilities under experiment.   
Conversely, other studies have come to different conclusions. For example, (Cooper & 
Philips, 2004) explored the relationship between safety climate and behavior change and their 
impact on incident rates, and “the study revealed that lower percent of safe behaviors were 
recorded as the number of incident rates decreased,” upholding therefore their previous study’s 
conclusion that the percentage of safe behaviors observed and incident rates are not necessary 
directly correlated (Cooper et al., 1994). It worth noting that similar to both the Cooper and 
Godbey studies above, much effectiveness evaluation research featured in the safety literature 
does not include the index of at-risk behaviors in their analysis. 
To What Extent Does BBS Process Impact Incident Rates? This question can be 
answered by observing how well BBS outcomes can predict incident rates. In fact, the 
predictability of incident rates through applied behavioral approaches is one of the recent focuses 
of behavioral safety intervention research. Prediction about people’s actions can be made “from 
the information about their past, their surrounding or their internal attributes" (Brauer, 2006). 
The same reasoning can be applied to an organization’s safety performance. Early safety 
performance predictive studies had focused on internal organizational attributes such as attitudes 
and beliefs because some behavioral theorists believed that they are predictors of safety-related 
behaviors. However, these views were somewhat undermined when the concept of cognitive 
dissonance had suggested that these internal attributes may not be good predictors of human 





Other studies have attempted to predict incident rates from organizational safety culture.  
A typical example would be the study performed by Razi (2006) where organizational safety 
culture was measured by using a Likert type scale survey model. The study hypothesized that 
“unavoidable” accident rates could be predicted by the culture of an organization. A linear 
regression analysis revealed that 9 per cent of the variance was predicted by the organization’s 
safety culture with R square = 0.092. The standard coefficients were negative, suggesting the 
existence of an inverse relationship. Although a quantitative methodology was used to assess this 
relationship through a safety culture survey, it is worth noting that the opinions of the survey’s 
participants are somewhat subjective; therefore the generality of this model may be questionable.  
Another factor believed to affect safety performance was work experience. Paul and 
Maiti (2007) designed a theoretical accident model exploring the relationship between safety 
performance and four human factors, including work experience in underground coal mining 
sites (p. 453). The hypothesis was that these variables could predict work related injuries; three 
of these human factors indicated a statistically significant positive relationship with work-related 
injuries. However, this study dealt with factors in relation to performing safety-related behaviors 
and does not actually determine the relationship between safety behaviors and work injuries.  
  (Haight et al., 2007) analyzed the relationship between Behavior-Based Safety and 
incident rates in an offshore oil production facility. The study looked at dependent variables such 
as the number of observation worksheets collected, total behaviors observed, at-risk behaviors 
and safe behaviors percentage. The independent variables included the number of total incidents, 
injuries, fires and near-misses. Ordinal logistic regression models were used and the authors 





is worth noting that the percentage of variability explained by all the variables in the regression 
models, expressed by the values of Nagelkerke’s R square, was about 1 to 3 per cent, with the 
best model explaining 39.8 percent of the variances with a p-value of 0.069. This best model 
involved all the independent variables together as input and the total incident rates as the 
dependent variable. This was one of the rare non survey-based studies using incident rates 
directly as outcome variables. However, the authors recognized that the relatively short period of 
time considered may have impacted the study’s results. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The principle objective of organizational safety intervention approaches is to protect and 
preserve the people and efficacy of resources. As (Pawson & Tilley, 2004) suggested, 
interventions are theories- incarnated, therefore understanding their underlining theories and 
concepts is critical to successful intervention’s evaluations. One cannot successfully prevent 
accidents if their causes are not uncovered and systematically addressed. Many accident 
causation theories have been devised and have brought about different safety prevention 
approaches. Traditional safety interventions were mostly design and administrative oriented with 
little emphasis on human factors. The few human approaches to accident prevention were 
heavily management focused and their results were seldom sustainable because of the lack of 
employee commitment. Behavior-Based Safety came about as addressing this gap by promoting 
worker’s behavioral change and fostering a continuous safety performance improvement. That is, 
mitigating incident rates at a point where safety performance is sustained. Since then, BBS 
processes have been widely adopted by organizations sometimes even without evidence of their 





Many of these organizations cannot afford to invest in ineffective safety programs. 
Therefore the effectiveness of these safety interventions should be established. Understanding 
the dynamic between Behavior-Based Safety interventions and the stage of changes is the 
starting point of identifying potential successful strategies. The literature review has suggested 
that, conceptually, safety-related behaviors can be modified through the BBS process and 
possibly impact incident rates. However, BBS’s practicability in decreasing incidents rates in 
realistic settings still needs to be objectively established. Intervention evaluation research offers 
systematic approaches to establishing BBS process effectiveness. Evaluative research on BBS 
has been decently represented in occupational safety literature. However, many of them are 
process-oriented. The few outcomes-oriented evaluations featured have considered the 
relationship between BBS outcomes and substitute outcomes instead of incident rates. Also, 
many of these studies were based on perception surveys. A large number of these studies 
suggested the existence of significant relationships between BBS and the substitute outcomes 
considered. However, as (Robson et al., 2007) pointed out in his systematic review of safety 
intervention effectiveness research, “the significance of these results for final outcomes remains 
unknown.” On the other hand, the rare studies which were not based on surveys and have 
considered final outcomes such as incident rates revealed none to little statistically significant 
relationships. In the light of this controversy, more non survey-based effectiveness studies 
considering the relationship between BBS and incident rates need to be undertaken to give 







                                      Chapter 3: Rationale 
3.1 Study Statement  
 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the BBS process in decreasing 
incident rates. The main argument of this study is that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between BBS process outcomes and incident rates in XYZ Oil Company. Therefore, 
the resources invested in this process are justified. This relationship can be established through 
statistical analyses of historical data of both BBS outcomes and incident rates over a period of 
five years. These data are shown in Appendix A and Appendix B. Furthermore, this study also 
seeks to explore how well BBS outcomes can predict incident rates in XYZ Oil Company. It is 
expected that, if XYZ Oil Company can predict incident rates, it would be possible to assess and 
adjust its safety intervention activities, such as BBS process, in order to meet safety performance 
targets.  
3.2 Research Objectives 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of Behavior-Based Safety 
intervention in decreasing incident rates in realistic settings. Generally, assessing the 
effectiveness of a safety intervention involves answering two basic questions related to whether 
or not the intervention works and to what extent it impacts desired outcomes. Answering these 
questions constitutes the framework of this study and it can be achieved the following ways. The 
relationship between BBS process and incident rates will be examined through statistical 
correlation approaches. Secondly, regression analyses will be used to quantify the extent of 





put into the BBS process in order to meet company performance targets. This study may help to 
identify effective safety intervention strategies and optimize the use of an organization’s 
resources. 
3.3 Study Significance 
 
The relevance of this work can be emphasized from two main perspectives. From a 
business standpoint, the results of this work may support the investment made by XYZ Oil 
Company into Behavior-Based Safety process. This study’s results may also be used as decision 
making guidance for resource allocation in similar industrial settings. From an organizational 
safety research perspective, BBS intervention effectiveness studies seem to be decently 
represented in the safety literature; however, a considerable number are based on perception 
surveys and use substitute (surrogated) outcomes measurement instead of incident rates making 
it rather difficult to objectively relate these studies’ results to incident rates.  In addition, the 
handful of non-survey based studies that have considered final outcomes measurement such as 
incident rates have inconsistently revealed the existence of a statistically significant relationship 
between Behavior-Based Safety processes and incident rates bringing about the need for more 
research of this genre. The present study may contribute to both the purpose of filling the gap in 
the safety literature and providing more insights into the impact of the BBS process on incident 
rates because this study relies on objective approaches and uses incident rates as final outcomes. 
3.4 Assumptions  
 
It is assumed in this study that incident data resulting from XYZ Oil Company’s safety 





that BBS intervention activities and quality were held constant throughout the time frame 
considered.  
3.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Two main hypotheses are considered in this study which are framed around the questions 
stated thereafter. 
3.5.1 Hypothesis 
• Null Hypothesis #1. 
H1: A significant positive relationship exists between BBS process outcomes and incident rates 
(alternative hypothesis). 
H01: There is no significant positive relationship between BBS process outcomes and incident 
rates. 
• Null Hypothesis #2 
H2: Behavior-Based Safety can predict incident rates (alternative hypothesis). 
H02: Behavior-Based Safety cannot predict incident rates. 
3.5.2 Study Questions 
• Q1. Does performing BBS observations increase work related safe behaviors? 
• Q2. What is the extent of the impact of Behavior-Based Safety processes on incidents 
rates?  






                                   Chapter 4: Methodology and Design 
4.1 Research Model 
 
The main purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of Behavior-Based Safety 
Process on incident rates in realistic settings. Data collected from BBS process and company’s 
incident reports were analyzed using some statistical techniques. Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used to perform a descriptive analysis of both safety-
related behaviors and incident rates. Also, linear regressions were used to develop predictive 
models. The research is based on the analysis of historical data provided by XYZ Oil Company 
administrative reports and company databases. The nature of the relationship between BBS 
intervention and incident rates was explored. In addition, the literature review of previous works 
and research performed on Behavior-Based Safety and safety performance measurement were 
considered in order to establish the study’s variables.  
4.2 The Basis for Research Model 
 
  This methodology was selected because of the difficulty of having a control group that is 
not performing BBS. In fact, the BBS process is already implemented companywide and it was 
not practical to suggest having a non-BBS group within XYZ Oil Company. Additionally, this 
would have required making an operational group stop doing BBS, exposing the company to 
potential safety performance threats. In addition, company historical data on incidents prior to 
BBS interventions were not readily available, leaving the author with no baseline for considering 
any quasi-experiment or longitudinal design. Therefore, a correlational study was deemed more 
appropriate. As it was suggested by Whitley & Kite (2012), “correlational strategies allow 





4.2 Data Collection and Description 
 
This correlation research is based on the analysis of historical data provided by XYZ Oil 
Company. These data were collected through software used to document BBS observations and 
company incidents data retrieved from company monthly safety performance reports and 
checked by the author against XYZ Oil Company’s incident investigation database for additional 
reliability. Five years of BBS historical data were analyzed. Actually, a total of 567,900 
observations performed by a daily average of 150 employees were input into the database during 
the selected period. These observations were grouped on a monthly basis. At the end of each 
month, data were selected and compared to the number of incidents registered for the same 
period of time to establish correlations and determine to what extent BBS impacts incident rates 
in the organization.  For this study, the following variables are considered.  
Dependent variables. These are the number of incidents per man-hours worked. The US 
Occupation Safety and Health Association (OSHA) standardized incident rates calculation was 
applied. It consists of multiplying the number of incidents by 200,000 (100 full time employees 
working 40 hours/day during 50 weeks) then dividing the result by the number of man-hours 
worked during the period considered. The review of XYZ Oil Company’s incidents historical 
data and previous studies performed in the oil industry led to the selection of the following 
operational variables for incident rates (Wurzelbacher & Jin, 2001).  
• The Rate of Near-Misses (NN) reported per employees -months. 
• The Rate of Injuries & Illnesses, including first aids (IN) per employees -months. 





• The Rate of Spills, including oil spills in water, lands and secondary containments 
reported (SP) per employees -months. 
• The Total Incident Rates (TE) per employees -months. 
Independent variables. Behavior-Based safety process is data driven and the data provided by 
this process may be used to quantify employees’ safety level within an organization. For 
consistency, these data are considered in terms of rates by dividing them by the man-hours 
worked. The review of the safety literature led to identifying the following BBS operational 
variables.  
• The Rate of Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe) per employees -months. 
• The Rate of At-Risk  Behaviors Observed (KRisk) per  employees -months. 
•  The Rate of Observation Sessions Performed (Obsheet) per employees -months. 
Obsheet consists of the number of the observation worksheets collected through the BBS 
tracking system. The frequency of observation sessions is important because it quantifies 
employees’ participation in the BBS process. 
4.3 Statistical Analysis 
 
Applied statistics to research may be either differential or associational. The former is 
generally applied when researchers are seeking to explore the difference between groups whereas 
the latter seeks to explore relationships between variables. This study, however, hypothesizes the 
existence of a significant relationship between variables; therefore associational tests would be 





research by Creswell (2008) and can be performed by using correlations and regressions 
analysis.   
 The incident data collected were analyzed to determine whether the process was in 
control because out of range data may indicate problems with the data collection process. Also, 
process variations may indicate the existence of special events, which may have occurred during 
the time period considered for this work. Such events may impact the research’s results. 
Therefore, they should be identified and dealt with prior to any correlation or regression analysis 
being performed. For this purpose, descriptive analysis and statistical process control (SPC) were 
performed to examine all the dependent variables in order to identify any process variations due 






                                     Chapter 5: Results 
 
The dependent variables were explored through descriptive statistics and Pearson 
moment correlation coefficients were computed to explore the relationship between BBS 
variables and incident rates, and the impact of the BBS process on incident rates was assessed 
through regression analyses as presented in this chapter. 
5.1 Statistical Process Control  
 
1. Total Incident Rates  (TE) 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Total Incident Rates 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TE 60 23.81 .00 23.81 8.2582 6.81394 
Valid N  60      
 
 
The Total Incident Rates (TE) registered monthly during a period of 5 years was analyzed; the 
variables range from 0 to 23.81 with the mean of 8.25 Incident Rate per month. The process 









Figure 0.1:  Process Control Chart of Incident Rates 
The process is fairly in control and there are no points above 3 standard deviations, suggesting 
that most of the variation was common causes. However, a pattern can be seen in case # 7 
corresponding to the period of April to July 2008 where there were no incidents. Another 
pattern can be seen in case 31 and 32 corresponding to months of June and July 2010 where 
there was a high rate of incidents. Nonetheless, the latter case indicated the existence of 
common causes which may need to be investigated internally so the process can be regarded 
as under control. 
2. Spill Rates (SP) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics were performed in order to examine the variation of Spill Rates and the 








Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Spill Rates 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
SP 60 15.87 .00 15.87 2.9853 3.97880 15.831 
Valid N (listwise) 60       
 
Spill Rates (SP) registered monthly during a period of 5 years were analyzed; the variables range 
from 0 to 15.87 Incident Rates with the mean of 2.985 Incident Rate per month. The Spill Rates 
process control chart is shown in Figure 5.2.   
 
   Figure 0.2: Process Control Chart of Spill Rates 
The process is fairly in control and most of the data are around 1 to 2 standard deviations except 
for case 31 which corresponds to July 2010, where the company actually registered a higher 
numbers of spills. This case may need to be investigated internally; however it does not appear to 







3. Injuries and Illnesses Rates (IN) 
 
 
The Rate of Injuries and Illnesses (IN) registered monthly during a period of 5 years were 
analyzed; the variables range from 0 to 7.94 Injuries Rates with the mean of 0.713 Injuries Rate 
per month. The result of the descriptive statistic is shown in Table 5.3 and the process control 
chart is illustrated in Figure 5.3 
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Injury and Illness Rates  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
IN 60 .00 7.94 .7173 1.71170 2.930 
Valid N (listwise) 60      
 
 
Figure 0.3: Process Control Chart of Injuries and Illness Rates  








for Case #2, located just beyond 2 standard deviations and Case #41 located out of 3 standard 
deviations. However, Case #2 may still be considered common causes because it is still located 
close to the other points on the graph.  On the other hand, Case #41 which corresponds to the 
month of May 2011 when Injuries Rates were a bit higher than normal may suggest the existence 
of special causes that need to be internally investigated.  In addition, some patterns could be seen 
on case #37 and #39 where two of three successive data were at 2 standard deviations. These 
latter cases correspond to months of March and May 2011 where the number of injuries was a 
little higher than normal and may require to be investigated internally. However, they still could 
be considered common causes because they are not out of 3 standard deviations and are still 
close to the other points on the graph. 
4. Fire Rates  (FI) 
The Rate of Fires was examined by using descriptive statistics and process control 
analyses. The results are shown on Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Fires Rates 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
FI 60 .00 4.72 .4459 1.26164 1.592 
Valid N  60      
       
 
Fire Rates (FI) registered monthly during a period of 5 years were analyzed. The variables range 
from 0 to 4.72 Fire Rates with the mean of 0.445 Fire Rates per month. Figure 5.4 illustrates a 






Figure 0.4: Process Control Chart of Fire Rates 
Because 10% of the data are above 2 SD, it can be suggested that the process is not in control.  
However, it is worth noting that fire incidents are generally not common. There are generally 
either one or no fires per month making the process appear as out of control even when it is 
really not.  
5. Near-Miss Rates (NN) 
 
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of Near-Miss Rates 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
NN 60 15.87 .00 15.87 3.3696 4.67516 21.857 
Valid N  60       
 
Near-Miss Rates (NN) registered monthly during a period of 5 years was analyzed; the variables 
range from 0 to 15.87 Near-Miss Rates with the mean of 3.3696 Near-Miss Rate per month.  The 









Figure 0.5: Process Control Chart of Near-Misses 
 
The process seems to be in control, and there is no data beyond 3standard deviations and the data 
are all well distributed around the mean and no concerning patterns could be observed. 
5.2 Correlational Analysis  
 
Univariate correlation analyses were performed to assess the relationship between each 
incident’s factors (dependent variables) and the independent variables (BBS outcomes). A total 
of fifteen regressions were performed. 
5.2.1Dependent Variable Total Incident Rates (TE) 
 
Regression 1 
Dependent Variable: Total Incident Rates (TE)                                                                                       
Independent Variable: Safe Behaviors Rate (KSafe)    








Table 5.6: Correlation Results between Total Incident Rates and Safe Behaviors 
 TE KSafe 
Pearson Correlation 
TE 1.000 .264 
KSafe .264 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
TE . .021 
KSafe .021 . 
N 
TE 60 60 
KSafe 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Total Incident Rates (TE) and the Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe) 
was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient computed was r= 0.264 at p< 0.05, suggesting the 
existence of a significant positive relationship between the two variables. However the 
association was rather small. The R square values obtained are shown in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: R-Values of the Correlation between Total Incidents and Safe Behaviors 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .264a .070 .054 6.62773 
 
 







Table 5.8: ANOVA Results between Total Incident Rates and Safe Behaviors 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 191.607 1 191.607 4.362 .041 
Residual 2547.753 58 43.927   
Total 2739.360 59    
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 




1.283 3.448  .372 .711 -5.618 
KSafe 68.804 32.944 .264 2.089 .041 2.860 
Dependent variable: TE 
Independent variable :KSafe 
Discussion 
A simple regression analysis was applied to investigate how well the rate of Total Incidents (TE) 
could be predicted from the Rate of Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe). The results were 
statistically significant F(1,58)= 4.36 at p< .05. The regression equation obtained to explain the 
relationship was TE = 1.28+68.804* KSafe. The adjusted R square value was 0.054 meaning that 
about 5.4 percent of the variances in Total Incidents (TE) could be explained by Safe Behaviors 
(KSafe). 
 







Dependent variable: Total Incidents (TE) 
 
Independent variable: At-Risk Behaviors (KRisk) 
The correlation between the two variables was assessed as illustrated in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: Correlation Results between Total Incident Rates and At-Risk Behaviors 
 TE KRisk 
Pearson Correlation 
TE 1.000 .218 
KRisk .218 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
TE . .047 
KRisk .047 . 
N 
TE 60 60 
KRisk 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Total Incident (TE) and the At-Risk Behaviors observed (KRisk) 
was assessed; the Pearson moment coefficient computed was r= 0.218 at p< 0.05 suggesting the 
existence of a significant positive relationship between the two variables. The values of the 
correlation coefficients are shown in Table 5.11. 
Table  5.11: R-Values of the Correlation between Incident Rates and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model 
 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .218a .047 .031 6.70732 





A regression of Total Incident Rates on the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors was performed and the 
results are illustrated in Table 5.12 and Table 5.13. 
Table  5.12: ANOVA Results between Total Incident Rates and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 130.052 1       130.052 2.891 .094 
Residual    2609.309 58         44.988   
Total     2739.360 59    
Dependent variable: TE 
Independent variable: KRisk 
 
 




Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) 3.660 2.840  1.289 .203 -2.024 







The association between Total Incident Rates and the Rate of Observation Sessions was 
examined and the results are shown in Table 5.14. 
Dependent variable: Total Incidents (TE) 
Independent Variable: Observation Sessions (Obsheet) 
Table 5.14: Correlation Results between Incident Rates and Observation Sessions 
     TE Obsheet 
Pearson Correlation 
TE 1.000 .295 
Obsheet .295  1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
TE .  .011 
Obsheet .011  . 
N 
TE 60    60 




A simple regression was applied to investigate how well Total Incident Rates (TE) could be 
predicted from the At-Risk Behaviors observed (KRisk). The results were not statistically 
significant F (1, 58) = 2.89 at p= 0.09 The regression equation drawn to explain the relationship 
was Total Incidents = 3.66 + 2206.35 * ( KRisk). The adjusted R square value was 0.031 
meaning that about 3.1 percent of the variances in Total Incident Rates could be explained by the 





The relationship between the rate of Total Incident (TE) and the Observation Sessions performed 
(Obsheet) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r = 0.295 at p< 0.05, 
suggesting the existence of a small significant positive relationship between the two variables. 
Regression analyses were also performed to assess how well the Rate of Total Incidents could be 
predicted by the Rate of Observation Sessions performed as illustrated in Table 5.15 and Table 
5.16. 
Table 5.15: R- Values of the Correlation between Total Incidents and Observation Sessions 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .295a .087 .072 6.56556 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Obsheet 
A regression of the Rate of Total Incidents on the Rate of Observation Sessions was performed 
and the results are presented on the Table 5.16 and Table 5.17. 
 Table 5.16: ANOVA Results between Total Incident Rates and Observation Sessions 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 239.182 1 239.182 5.549 .022 
Residual 2500.178 58 43.107   
Total 2739.360 59    
Dependent variable: TE 





 Table 5.17: Regression Coefficients of Total Incident Rates on Observation Sessions 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) -1.013 4.026  -.252 .802 -9.072 
Obsheet 430.308 182.678 .295 2.356 .022 64.638 
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well the Total Incidents Rates (TE) could be 
predicted by the observation sheets collected (Obsheet). The results were statistically significant: 
F(1,58)= 5.55 at p<0.05. The regression equation drawn to explain the relationship was           
Y=-1.013 + 430.308 X suggesting that Total Incidents = -1.013+ 430.308 * (Obsheet). The 
adjusted R square value was 0.072 meaning that about 7 percent of the variances in total 
incidents could be explained by safe behaviors.   
5.2.2 Dependent Variable: Near-Misses Rates (NN) 
 
Regression 1 
Dependent variable: Near-Misses Rates (NN) 
Independent variable: At-Risk Behaviors Rates (KRisk) 








Table 5.18: Correlation Results between Near-Miss Rates and At-Risk Behaviors 
 NN KRisk 
Pearson Correlation 
NN 1.000 .119 
KRisk .119 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
NN . .184 
KRisk .184 . 
N 
NN 60 60 
KRisk 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Near-Miss (NN) and the At-Risk Behaviors (KRisk) was 
assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient computed was r= 0.119. However, the relationship 
was not statically significant p>0.05.  Regression analyses were also performed and the results 
are shown in Table 5.19 and Table 5.20. 




Table 5.20: ANOVA Results between Near-Miss Rates and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 18.116 1 18.116 .826 .367 
Residual 1271.456 58 21.922   
Total 1289.572 59    
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 





The regression coefficients obtained are displayed in Table 5.21. 
Table 5.21: Regression Coefficients of Near-Misses on At-Risk Behaviors 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) 1.653 1.982  .834 .408 -2.314 
KRisk 823.463 905.841 .119 .909 .367 -989.775 
Dependent Variable: NN 
Discussion 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well Near-Miss Rates (NN) could be 
predicted from At-Risk Behaviors (KRisk). The results were not statistically significant: 
F(1,58)= .826 at p=.367. The adjusted R square value was -003 meaning zero percent of the 
variances in Near-Misses could be explained by At-Risk Behaviors. 
Regression 2 
Dependent variable: Near-Misses (NN) 
Independent variable: Safe Behaviors (KSafe) 








Table 5.22: Correlation Results between Near-Miss and Safe Behavior Rates 
 
 
     NN  KSafe 
Pearson Correlation 
NN 1.000 .138 
KSafe .138    1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
NN .  .147 
KSafe .147  . 
N 
NN 60     60 
KSafe 60    60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Near-Misses (NN) and the Safe Behaviors Observed 
(KSafe) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= .138 at p =.147 
suggesting that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The 
values of the coefficient of correlations are summarized in Table 5.23.  
Table 5.23: R-Values of the Correlation between Near-Miss and Safe Behaviors 
Model 
 




.138 .019 .002 4.67022 
 
A regression of the Rate of Near-Misses on the Rate of Safe Behaviors was performed and the 







Table 5.24: The ANOVA Results between Near-Miss and Safe Behavior Rates 
Model Sum of Squares          df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 24.537 1 24.537 1.125 .293 
Residual 1265.035 58 21.811   
Total 1289.572 59    
 Dependent variable: NN 
 Predictors: (Constant), KSafe 





Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) .874 2.429  .360 .720 -3.989 
KSafe 24.622 23.214 .138 1.061 .293 -21.846 
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well Near-Miss Rates (NN) could be 
predicted from Safe Behaviors (KSafe). The results were not statistically significant: 
F(1,58)=1.125 at p=.293. The adjusted R square value was 002 meaning zero percent of the 
variances in Near-misses could be explained by Safe Behaviors.    
Regression 3 
 
Dependent variable: Near-Misses (NN) 





The correlation between the two variables was examined and the results are shown in Table 5.26. 
Table 5.26: Correlation Results between Near-Misses and Observation Sessions 
 NN Obsheet 
Pearson Correlation 
NN 1.000 .131 
Obsheet .131 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
NN . .159 
Obsheet .159 . 
N 
NN 60 60 
Obsheet 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Near-Misses (NN) and the Rate of Observation Sessions 
performed (Obsheet) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= .131 at    
p =.159 suggesting that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. 
The results of the analyses performed are shown on the Table 5.27. 
Table 5.27: R-Values of the Correlation between Near-Misses and Observation Sessions 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .131a .017 .000 4.67455 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Obsheet 
 
A regression of the Rate of Near-Misses on the Rate of Observation Sessions was performed, and 






Table 5.28: ANOVA Results between Near-Misses and Observation Sessions 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 22.189 1 22.189 1.015 .318 
Residual 1267.383 58 21.851   
Total 1289.572 59    
 
    Table 5.29:  Regression Coefficients of Near-Misses on Observation Sessions 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 




.546 2.867  .190 .850 -5.192 
Obsheet 
 
131.064 130.063 .131 1.008 .318 -129.286 
 
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well Near-Misses Rates (NN) could be 
predicted from the  rate of Observation Sessions documented by the observation sheets collected 
(Obsheet). The results were not statistically significant: F (1, 58) = 1.015, p=.318. The adjusted 
R square value was .000 meaning zero percent of the variances in Near-misses could be 






5.2.3 Dependent Variable: Injuries and Illnesses Rates (IN) 
 
Regression 1 
Dependent variable: Injuries and Illness Rates (IN) 
Independent variable: At-Risk Behaviors Rates (KRisk) 
Table 5.30: Correlation Results between Injuries/Illness and At- Risk Behaviors 
 IN KRisk 
Pearson Correlation 
IN 1.000 -.033 
KRisk -.033 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
IN . .402 
KRisk .402 . 
N 
IN 60 60 
KRisk 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Injuries/Illnesses (IN) and the At-Risk Behaviors observed             
(KRisk) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r = .138 at p =.402 
suggesting that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The R 
square values are shown in Table 5.31. 
Table 5.31:  R-Values of the Correlation between Injuries/Illnesses and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 





A regression of the Rate of Injuries on At-Risk Behavior Rates was performed to investigate how 
well the Rate of injuries could be predicted from At-Risk Behavior Rates. The results obtained 
are shown in Table 5.32 and Table 5.33. 
Table 5.32:  ANOVA Results between Injuries/Illnesses and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model Sum of Squares             df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .183 1 .183 .062 .805 
Residual 172.682 58    2.977   
Total 172.865 59    
Dependent variable: IN 
 Predictors: (Constant), KRisk 
Table 5.33:  Regression Coefficients of Injuries/Illnesses on At-Risk Behaviors 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) .890 .731  1.218 .228 -.572 
KRisk -82.856 333.830 -.033 -.248 .805 -751.088 
 
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well Injuries and Illness Rates (IN) could be 
predicted from At- Risk Behaviors (KRisk). The results were not statistically significant: 
F(1,58) = .062 and  p = .805. The adjusted R square value was .016 meaning that only 1.6 








Dependent variable: Injuries and Illness (IN) 
Independent variable: Observation Sheets (Obsheet) 
Table 5.34: Correlation Results between Injuries/Illnesses and Observation Sessions 
 IN Obsheet 
Pearson Correlation 
IN 1.000 -.109 
Obsheet -.109 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
IN . .203 
Obsheet .203 . 
N 
IN 60 60 
Obsheet 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Injuries and Illnesses (IN) and the Observation Sessions 
performed (Obsheet) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= -.109 at   
p = .203 suggesting that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables.  The values of the coefficients of correlation are summarized on Table 5.35. 
 
 
 Predictors: (Constant), Obsheet 
A regression of the Rate of Injuries on the Rate of Observation Sessions was performed and the 
results are illustrated in Table 5.36 and 5.37.  
Table 5.35: R-Values of the Correlation between Injuries/Illnesses and Observation Sessions 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 





Table 5.36: ANOVA Results Between Injuries/Illnesses and Observation Sessions 
Model Sum of Squares            df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2.061 1 2.061 .700 .406 
Residual 170.805 58 2.945   
Total 172.865 59    
Dependent variable: IN 
Predictors: (Constant), Obsheet 
 
Dependent variable: IN 
 
 
The correlation analysis performed suggested the existence of a small inverse relationship                 
(r= -.109 at p=0.203) between the two variables; however, it was not statistically significant. A 
simple regression was applied to investigate how well Injuries Rates (IN) could be predicted 
from the Rate of Observation Sheets (Obsheet). The results were not statistically significant: 
F(1,58)=.700 at  p=.406. The adjusted R square value was - .005 meaning that zero percent of the 
variances in Injuries Rates could be explained by the Rate of Observation Sheets. 
 
 
Table 3.37: Regression Coefficients of Injuries/Illnesses and Observation Sessions 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) 1.578 1.052  1.499 .139 -.529 







The relationship between the Rate of Injuries/ Illnesses and the Rate of Safe Behaviors was 
examined and the results of the correlational analysis are shown on Table 5.38. 
Table 5.38: Correlations Results between Injuries/Illnesses and Safe Behaviors  
    IN KSafe 
Pearson Correlation 
IN 1.000 -.145 
KSafe -.145 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
IN . .135 
KSafe .135 . 
N 
IN 60 60 
KSafe 60 60 
Dependent variable: Injuries/ Illnesses (IN) 
Independent variable: Safe Behaviors (KSafe) 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Injuries and Illnesses (IN) and the Safe Behaviors Observed    
(KSafe) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient computed was r= -.145 at p =.135 
suggesting that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The R 
square values are shown in Table 5.39. 
Table 5. 39: R-Values of the Correlation between Injuries/Illnesses and Safe Behaviors  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 





A regression of the Rate of Injuries and Illnesses on the Rate of Safe Behaviors was 
performed and the results are illustrated in Table 5.40 and Table 5.41. 
Table 5.40: ANOVA Results between Injuries/Illnesses and Safe Behaviors 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
              df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 3.618 1 3.618 1.240 .270 
Residual 169.248 58 2.918   
Total 172.865 59    
 Dependent variable: IN 
 Predictors: (Constant), KSafe 
The Regression coefficients are shown in Table 5.41. 
 
 
5.2.4 Dependent Variable: Spill (SP) 
Regression 1 
A regression of Spill Rates was performed on the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors in order to assess 
how well Spill Rates could be predicted from the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors. The results are 
illustrated the Table 5.42. 
Table 5.41: Regression Coefficients of Injuries/Illnesses on Safe Behaviors 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) 1.676 .889  1.886 .064 -.103 





Table 5.42: Correlation Results between Spills and Safe Behaviors 
 SP KRisk 
Pearson Correlation 
SP 1.000 .221 
KRisk .221 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
SP . .045 
KRisk .045 . 
N 
SP 60 60 
KRisk 60 60 
 
The relationship between Spill Rates (SP) and At-Risk Behaviors observed (KRisk) was 
assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= 0.221 at p< 0.05 suggesting the 
existence of a small significant positive relationship between the two variables. The R square 
Values are shown in Table 5.43.  
Table 5.43: R-Values of the Correlation between Spills and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
 
.221 .049 .032 3.91371 










The results of the regression analysis are illustrated in Table 5.44 and Table 5.45. 
Table 5.44: ANOVA Results between Spill and At-Risk Behavior Rates 
Model Sum of Squares         df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 45.628 1 45.628 2.979 .090 
Residual 888.395 58 15.317   
Total 
 
934.022 59    
Dependent variable : SP 
Predictors ( Constant),KRisk 
Table 5.45: Regression Coefficients of Spill Rates on At-Risk Behavior Rates 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
 
(Constant) .262 1.657  .158 .875 -3.055 
KRisk 
 
1306.862 757.189 .221 1.726 .090 -208.816 
     a. Dependent variable: SP  
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well spills rate (SP) could be predicted from 
the At-risk behaviors observed (KRisk). The results were not statistically significant F(1,58)= 
2.979 and  p=.090. The regression equation drawn to explain the relationship was Spills = 262 + 
1306.862 * KRisk (At-Risk Behaviors). The adjusted R square value was 0.032 meaning that 






The association between Spill Rates and the Rate of Observation Sessions was examined and the 
results are illustrated in Table 5.46. 
Table 5.46: Correlation Results between Spills and Observation Sessions 
 SP Obsheet 
Pearson Correlation 
SP 1.000 .333 
Obsheet .333 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
SP . .005 
Obsheet .005 . 
N 
SP 60 60 
Obsheet 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Spill (SP) and the Observation Sessions performed 
(Obsheet) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= 0.333 at p< 0.01 
suggesting the existence of a small significant positive relationship between the two variables.   
The R square values are shown in Table 5.47. 
Table 5.47: R-Values of the Correlations between Spills and Observation Sessions 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
 
.333 .111 .096 3.78325 
Dependent variable: Spills (SP) 






A regression of Spill Rates on the Rate of Observation Sessions was performed and the results 
are presented in Table 48 and Table 49. 
Table 5.48: ANOVA Results between Spills and Observation Sessions 
Model Sum of Squares          df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 103.868 1 103.868 7.257 .009 
Residual 830.154 58 14.313   
Total 934.022 59    
Depended variable: SP 
Predictors: (Constant), Obsheet 
 Table 5.49:  Regression Coefficients of Spills on Observation Sessions 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) -3.124 2.320  -1.347 .183 -7.768 





The association between Spill Rates and the Rate of Safe Behaviors was examined and the 









Table 5.50: Correlation Results between Spills and Safe Behaviors 
 SP KSafe 
Pearson Correlation 
SP 1.000 .335 
KSafe .335 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
SP . .004 
KSafe .004 . 
N 
SP 60 60 
KSafe 60 60 
Dependent variable: Spill (SP) 
Independent variable: Safe Behaviors (KSafe). 
 
The relationship Between Spill Rates (SP) and the Rate of Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe) was 
assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient computed was r= 0.335 at p< 0.05 suggesting the 
existence of a small significant positive relationship between the two variables. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient obtained may suggest a weak association between the two variables. The 
R square values are shown in Table 5.51. 
Table 5.51: R-Values between Spills and Safe Behaviors 











A regression of Spill Rates on the Rate of Safe Behaviors was performed in order to assess how 
well Spill Rates could be predicted from the Rate of Safe Behaviors. The results of the regression 
are shown in Table 5.52 and Table 5.53. 
Table 5.52: ANOVA Results between Spills and Safe Behaviors 
Model Sum of Squares          df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 104.866 1 104.866 7.335 .009 
Residual 829.156 58 14.296   
Total 
 
934.022 59    
 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) -2.175 1.967  -1.106 .273 -6.112 
KSafe 
 
50.901 18.794 .335 2.708 .009 13.281 
 
Dependent variable: SP 
 Dependent variable: SP 
Predictors: (Constant), KSafe 
 





A simple regression was applied to investigate how well Spill Rates (SP) could be predicted 
from the Rate of Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe). The results were statistically significant:      
F (1, 58) = 7.335 at p< .05. The regression equation drawn to explain the relationship was                                 
Spill Rates = -2.175 + 50.9 * (Safe Behaviors). The adjusted R square value was 0.097 meaning 
that about 9.7 percent of the variances in Spill Rates could be explained by the Rate of Safe 
Behaviors.  
5.2.5 Dependent Variable: Fire Rates (FI) 
 
Regression 1 
A regression of Fire Rates on the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors was performed in order to assess 
how well Fire Rates could be predicted from the Rate of At-Risks Behaviors. The results are 
shown in Table 5.54. 
Table 5.54: Correlation Results between Fires and At-Risk Behaviors 
 FI KRisk 
Pearson Correlation 
FI 1.000 -.029 
KRisk -.029 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
FI . .413 
KRisk .413 . 
N 
FI 60 60 






The relationship between the Rate of Fires and the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors observed was 
assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r = -.029 suggesting the existence of a 
weak negative relationship; however, it was not statistically significant p<0.05. The R square 
values are shown in Table 5.55. 
Table 5.55:  R-Values of the Correlation between Fires and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .029 .001 -.016 1.27194 
 
A regression of Fire Rates on the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors was performed and the results are 
presented in Table 5.56 and Table 5.57. 
   Table 5.56: ANOVA Results between Fires and At-Risk Behaviors 
Model Sum of Squares            df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .078 1 .078 .048 .826 
Residual 93.834 58 1.618   
Total 93.912 59    
Dependent variable: KRisk 












The Regression Coefficients of the Rate of Fires on the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors are shown in 
Table 5.57.  
Dependent variable: FI 
Predictors: (Constant), KRisk 
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well the Rate of Fires (FI) could be 
predicted from At- Risk Behaviors (KRisk). The results were not statistically significant:           
F (1, 58) = .048 at p=.826. The adjusted R square value was - .016 meaning that only 1.6 percent 
of the variances in Fire Rates could be explained by At-Risk Behaviors.    
 Regression 2 
 
 
The association between the Rate of Fires and the Rate of the Observation Sessions performed 
was assessed. The results are shown in Table 5.58. 
 
  Table 5.57: Regression Coefficients of Fires on At-Risk Behaviors 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) .559 .538  1.038 .304 -.519 
KRisk 
 





Table 5.58 Correlation Results between Fires and Observation Sessions Behaviors 
 FI Obsheet 
Pearson Correlation 
FI 1.000 -.076 
Obsheet -.076 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
FI . .281 
Obsheet .281 . 
N 
FI 60 60 
Obsheet 60 60 
Dependent variable: Fire (FI) 
Independent variable: Observation Sheets (Obsheet) 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Fires (FI) and the Observation Sessions performed 
(Obsheet) was assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= -.076 at p = .281 
suggesting that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The R 
square values are shown in Table 5.59 
Table 5.59: R-Values of the Correlation between Fires and Observation Sessions  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .076 .006 -.011 1.26875 
 
A regression of Fire Rates on Observation Session Rates was performed and the results are 






Table 5.60: ANOVA Results between Fires and Observation Sessions  
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .548 1 .548 .341 .562 
Residual 93.364 58 1.610   
Total 93.912 59    
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well the Rate of Fires (FI) could be predicted 
from the Rate of Observation Sessions (Obsheet). The results were not statistically significant:   
F (1, 58) = .341 at p=.562, the adjusted  R square value was - .011 meaning that only 1.1 percent 
of the variances in Fire Rates could be explained by the Rate of Observation Sessions (Obsheet). 
Regression 3 
Dependent variable: Fire Rates (FI) 
Independent variable: Safe Behavior Rates (KSafe) 
Independent variable : Obsheet 
Dependent variable : FI 
 
        Table 5.61: Regression Coefficients of Fires on Observation Sessions 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound 
1 
(Constant) .890 .778  1.144 .257 -.668 





The association between the Rates of Fires and Safe Behaviors observed was examined; the 
Pearson correlation coefficient was computed as illustrated on the Table 5.62. 
Table 5.62:  Correlation Results between Fire and Safe Behaviors 
 FI KSafe 
Pearson Correlation 
FI 1.000 -.098 
KSafe -.098 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
FI . .228 
                           .   
N 
FI 60 60 
KSafe 60 60 
 
The relationship between the Rate of Fires (FI) and the Rate of Safe Behaviors (KSafe) was 
assessed. The Pearson moment coefficient calculated was r= -.098 at p = .228, suggesting that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The R square values 
are shown in Table 5.63. 
Table 5.63: R-Values of the Correlation between Fires and Observation Sessions 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .098a .010 -.007 1.26633 






A regression of Fire Rates on the Rate of Safe Behaviors was performed and the results are 
presented in Table 5.64 and Table 5.65. 
Table 5.64: ANOVA Results between Fires and Safe Behaviors 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .904 1 .904 .564 .456 
Residual 93.008 58 1.604   
Total 93.912 59    
Dependent variable: FI 
Predictors: (Constant), KSafe 
 
The Regression coefficients are shown in Table 5.65. 
 
Table 5.65: Regression Coefficients of Fires on Safe Behaviors 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
      t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .925 .659  1.404 .166 
KSafe -4.726 6.294 -.098 -.751 .456 
 
A simple regression was applied to investigate how well the Rate of Fires (FI) could be predicted 
from Safe Behaviors (KSafe). The results were not statistically significant: F (1, 58) = .564 at 
p=.456. The adjusted R square value was -.007 meaning that zero percent of the variances in Fire 





5.2.6 Correlation between the Rate of Observation Sessions and the Rate of Safe Behaviors 
 
One of the questions evolved from this study was to investigate the impact on BBS of 
performing BBS observations on worker’s safety-related behaviors. Does the frequency of 
observations promote work related safe behaviors? The scatter plot drawn suggested the 
existence of a linear relationship between Observation Sessions and the Safe Behaviors 
observed. The slope of the line also suggested that the nature of the relationship is positive.  
 
Figure 0.6: Scatter Plots of the Relations between Safe Behaviors and Observations Sessions  
 
In addition to the scatter plot, a correlation analysis was performed between the two 






Table 5.66: Correlation Results between Observation sessions and Safe Behavior Rates 
 KSafe Obsheet 
KSafe 
Pearson Correlation 1 .865 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 60 60 
Obsheet 
Pearson Correlation .865 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 60 60 
 
The correlation analysis was performed and suggested the existence of a strong positive 
statistically significant relationship between the Rate of  Observation Sessions and Safe 
Behaviors observed, p value < 0.01 and the Pearson coefficient r = 0.865. This result implies that 
when the rate of observation session increases, the rate of safe behaviors tend to increase. 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
 
Correlation and regression analyses were performed to explore the nature of the 
relationship between Behavior-Based Safety outcomes and incident rates in XYZ Oil Company. 
Among the 15 correlations examined, six of them were statistically significant. Actually, these 
significant correlations were related to two type of relationships: the one between BBS and the 
total incident rates and the one between BBS and oil spill rates. In the first case, when the 
relationship between BBS and the total incident rates was examined, a statistically significant p 
value <0.05 correlation was found between the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors observed (KRisk) and 
Total Incidents (TE). The Pearson moment coefficient r =.218 value suggested the existence of a 





behaviors observed increases, the total incidents rate also increases. In addition, the regressions 
performed revealed an adjusted R square value of 0.031 suggesting that only 3.1 % of the 
variances in incident rates can be explained by the independent variable. These results also 
suggested the existence of other variables, not identified by this study, that may modify or 
impact the relationship between the two variables. For example, other organizational safety 
elements such as supervisor’s safety leadership, organizational capability, and work shift 
management may impact the relationship. Also, the quality of observation sessions performed 
such as feedback may also modify the nature of the relationship.  
Another trend that could be observed was the existence of a small positive significant 
relationship between Incident Rates (TE) and both the Rate of Observation Sessions performed 
(Obsheet) and Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe); on the other hand, Obsheet and KSafe were 
also strongly corrected. These positive correlations suggest that when the rate of observation 
sessions performed increases, the rate of incidents also increases. Even if the Pearson coefficient 
of correlation was rather small, the possibility of the incident’s occurrence influencing the trend 
of observations performed is not to be discarded since a causal relationship may not be 
established through correlational studies alone. It appears that when incident rates increase, BBS 
is overly emphasized leading to an increase of observation sessions; however, when the rate of 
incidents decreases, this emphasis no longer exists, therefore the rate of observation sessions 
performed also decreases.  
In the second case, when the relationship between BBS and oil Spill rates was examined, 
similar correlations were found. The rate of At-Risk Behaviors was significantly correlated to 





between Spill Rates (SP) and both the Rate of Observation Sessions performed (Obsheet),                 
r= 0.333 at p<0.05 and the Rate of Safe Behaviors observed (KSafe), r = 0.335 at p< 0.05. 
However, it is important to notice that Spill Rates (SP) constitute a large part of the total 
incidents and was found to be strongly correlated to Incident Rates r =0.631 at p < 0.01. 
Therefore only the results of the correlations related to Total Incidents (TE) were considered. 
Additionally, the impact of performing observations on workers’ safety-related behaviors 
was also assessed. A strong positive relationship was observed between the Rate of Safe 
Behaviors (KSafe) and the Rate of Observation Sessions (Osheet), meaning that when the rate of 
observation sessions increases, the rate of safe behaviors observed also increases. While a causal 
relationship may not be determined, this correlation may suggest that the more people are 
observed, the more safe behaviors are recorded.  
Regression analyses were also performed to investigate whether or not XYZ Incident Rates 
could be predicted by BBS outcomes. Only the statistically significant correlations were 
considered for the regressions analysis. The regression models obtained are listed below.  
• TE = 3.66 + 2206.35 * KRisk. For this regression, the adjusted R square value was 0.031 
meaning that about 3.1 percent of the variances in total incidents could be explained by 
the rate of At-Risk behaviors 
•  TE = -1.013+ 430.308 * Obsheet. For this regression the adjusted R square value was 
0.072 meaning that about 7 percent of the variances in total incidents could be explained 





• TE = 1.28+68.804* KSafe. For this regression, the adjusted R square value was 0.054 
meaning that about 5.4 percent of the variances in total incidents (TE) could be explained 
by the Rate of Safe Behaviors (KSafe). 
•  SP = 262 + 1306.862 * KRisk. For this regression, the adjusted R square value was 
0.032 meaning that about 3.2 percent of the variances in Spill Rates (SP) could be 
explained by the Rate of At-Risk Behaviors. 
• SP= 3.124 + 283.57 * Obsheet. For this regression, the adjusted R square value was .096 
meaning that about 9.6 percent of the variances in Spills Rate (SP) could be explained by 
the Rate of Observation sessions performed. 
• SP= -2.175 + 50.9 * Safe Behaviors. The adjusted  R square value was 0.097 meaning 
that about 9.7 percent of the variances in Spill Rates (SP) could be explained by the Rate 
of Safe Behaviors 
The predictive models resulting from these regression analyses were rather weak, suggesting that 
BBS outcomes alone may not be good predictors of incident rates. In fact, the better model could 
only explain 9.7 % of the variances in Incident Rates. This suggests that additional variables 
should be considered for stronger predictive models. Chapter 6 summarizes the study’s 








                                 Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Limitation and Future Works 
 
Despite the relevance of this study in the area of occupational safety interventions and the 
safety literature in general, the following conditions may be regarded as possible limitations of 
this work. This study considered the data from a production department in the XYZ Oil 
Company and therefore may not be readily generalized to other areas of the company nor may it 
be easily extended to other oil production companies. Secondly, the lack of control group made it 
hard to determine whether the safety performance outcomes measurement would be different 
without BBS intervention since causal effects were not determined. Additionally, even if BBS 
could be recognized as the most relevant safety intervention applied at that time, this study did 
not consider the interaction of BBS intervention with other incident prevention strategies applied 
at XYZ Oil Company. 
Finally, this study evaluates the effectiveness of BBS intervention as a whole; thus, it did 
not allow for determining the causal role or impact of individual components of the BBS process. 
Also, being mainly a summative evaluation research, this work does not focus on the process 
quality per se. Thus, potential qualitative process variance may affect the study’s results. 
Despite the intent of behavior-based safety intervention being to decrease incident rates, 
unintended outcomes may result as it usually occurs with any process intervention. For instance, 
a BBS intervention can potentially affect non-targeted safety-related behaviors or other 
company’s business aspects such as productivity. Moreover, it may be that BBS intervention 





programs, an event sometimes referred to as effect modifiers. Further research may consider 
exploring these possibilities. 
This study involves continuous scale variables which were assumed as normally and 
independently distributed. Also, first order regression equations were considered in this research.    
6.2 Occupational Application 
 
The results of this work have several applications to the work environment. The study 
performed indicates that Behavior-Based Safety is a valuable tool for fostering safety-related 
behaviors in workplaces. However, merely implementing the BBS process will not suffice to 
lower incident rates. BBS is definitely not a magic bullet against incidents, as many consulting 
companies selling the program tend to suggest, since the best BBS predictive model could only 
explain less than 10% of the incidents’ variation. However BBS may work together with other 
safety programs to effectively lower incidents rates. 
  The study also suggested that BBS outcomes were not good predictors of incidents rates, 
and other organizational factors may need to be considered such as the supervisors’ safety 
leadership, work shift management, and organizational capability. In addition, the quality of BBS 
sessions such as feedback and the promptness of an action plan may also impact the 
effectiveness of the BBS process. Many organizations tend to focus on the number of BBS 
observations performed and the rate of safe behaviors instead of the quality of the observations 






 At-risk behaviors should be given more attention because it was revealed to be 
statistically and significantly correlated to the incident rates, what Tomas Krause called the 
critical mass of incidents. However it should not be the only focus for injury prevention 
strategies. In fact, the traditional accident pyramid, which usually involves at-risk behaviors, may 
not be the only critical path to accidents for all types of industries. For high risk industries such 
as oil production companies, a latent path may exist escaping the traditional safety triangle path, 
and leading directly to the major incidents. 
In relation to XYZ Company, it can be recommended that other safety programs be given 
attention since this study suggests that BBS impact on incidents rates is rather small. Therefore, 
other safety strategies should be emphasized and the resources allocated to BBS activities should 
be reconsidered in order to optimize company resources. Furthermore, from this study, it appears 
that the BBS process in XYZ Oil Company tended to work in a cyclical mode. The proactive 
merit of the BBS process will be limited if the process is either overly or hardly emphasized 




The aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the BBS process in decreasing 
incident rates in XYZ Oil Company in order to help optimizing the resources allocated to 
incident prevention strategies. For this purpose, the nature of the relationship between BBS 
outcomes and incident rates was examined; the impact of BBS process on incident rates was 
quantified and its predictability assessed. Based on BBS conceptual design and theoretical 





statistically significant relationship existed between at-risk behaviors and incidents rates, 
meaning that when more at-risk behaviors are observed, the incident rates tend to increase. A 
correlation analysis was performed to test this hypothesis and study results revealed the existence 
of a positive statistically significant relationship (p < 0.05) between the rates of at-risk behaviors 
and total incidents. However, the association was rather weak. 
The second hypothesis suggested the existence of a negative correlation between the rate 
of safe behaviors and incident rates. Similar analyses were performed and the results revealed the 
existence of a statistically significant positive relationship between safe behaviors and total 
incident rates, therefore the null hypothesis was not rejected and the alternative hypothesis was 
not supported. Similarly, the third hypothesis, suggesting the existence of a negative relationship 
between the rate of observation sessions performed and the incident rates, was tested. The results 
revealed the existence of a statistically significant positive relationship between the rate of 
observation sessions and total incident rates; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. The 
test results related to the second and third hypothesis suggested that the BBS process may be 
working on a cyclical or crisis mode. It appears that when incident rates increase, more BBS 
observations are performed and the contrary occurs when incident rates decrease. It is hoped that 
future studies may be performed to investigate a causal relationship between these variables.      
Two study questions framed this work. The first one asked whether incident rates could 
be predicted from BBS outcomes.  The regression analyses performed on the statistically 
significant correlation revealed that the best regression model drawn could only explain less than   
10% of the incident rates variance, suggesting that BBS outcomes were not good predictors of 





increase workers’ safe behaviors. A simple scatter plot suggested that the rate of safe behaviors 
tend to increase when the rate of observation sessions performed increases. The findings of this 
research led to the conclusion that the BBS process can foster safe behaviors in workplaces. 
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Appendix A: Five Years BBS Outcomes Spreadsheet  
Count ID Months Safe At- 
Risk 













2008                     
1 108 Jan 2,556 64 2,620 810 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.02 
2 208 Feb 2,656 48 2,704 779 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.02 
3 308 Mar 3,401 132 3,533 945 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
4 408 Apr 3,550 50 3,600 879 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.02 
5 508 May 4,360 76 4,436 875 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
6 608 Jun 4,351 94 4,445 1081 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
7 708 Jul 5,174 72 5,246 1121 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 
8 808 Aug 3,905 64 3,969 989 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
9 908 Sep 4,280 71 4,351 1025 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.02 
10 1008 Oct 3,917 68 3,985 965 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
11 1108 Nov 3,416 30 3,446 956 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.02 
12 1208 Dec 4,744 78 4,822 1179 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.02 
Total   Year 43,754 783 44,537 11,604 0.88 0.02 0.87 0.23 
2009                     
13 109 Jan 5,947 129 6,076 1344 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.03 
14 209 Feb 5,139 81 5,220 1165 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 





16 409 Apr 5,919 185 6,104 1261 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.03 
17 509 May 6,009 157 6,166 1258 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.02 
18 609 Jun 5,618 110 5,728 996 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.02 
19 709 Jul 5,487 130 5,617 1290 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.03 
20 809 Aug 5,094 119 5,213 1072 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 
21 909 Sep 4,548 121 4,669 1045 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
22 1009 Oct 4,349 100 4,449 1023 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
23 1109 Nov 3,966 102 4,068 886 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
24 1209 Dec 3,794 45 3,839 662 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.01 
Total   Year 60,125 1424 61,549 13,117 1.22 0.03 1.19 0.26 
2010                     
25 110 Jan 5,007 98 5,105 1041 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 
26 210 Feb 3,900 113 4,013 893 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
27 310 Mar 8,033 185 8,218 1432 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.03 
28 410 Apr 6,276 121 6,397 1206 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.02 
29 510 May 4,991 120 5,111 1065 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 
30 610 Jun 4,479 87 4,566 926 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
31 710 Jul 6,090 121 6,211 1268 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.03 
32 810 Aug 6,968 125 7,093 1381 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.03 
33 910 Sep 5,708 111 5,819 1237 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.02 
34 1010 Oct 6,331 162 6,493 1269 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.03 





36 1210 Dec 6,191 150 6,341 1404 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.03 
Total   Year 69,118 1495 70,613 14,272 1.40 0.03 1.37 0.28 
2011                     
37 111 Jan 5,188 132 5,320 1330 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.03 
38 211 Feb 5,294 143 5,437 1237 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.02 
39 311 Mar 3,869 105 3,974 919 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
40 411 Apr 4,398 101 4,499 1007 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
41 511 May 4,467 100 4,567 932 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
42 611 Jun 4,467 100 4,567 977 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
43 711 Jul 4,442 88 4,530 965 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
44 811 Aug 4,316 117 4,433 917 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.02 
45 911 Sep 3,831 77 3,908 996 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.02 
46 1011 Oct 4,792 110 4,902 1374 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.03 
47 1111 Nov 7,156 127 7,283 1279 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.03 
48 1211 Dec 6,130 126 6,256 1200 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.02 
Total   Year 58,350 1326 59,676 13,133 1.18 0.03 1.16 0.26 
2012                     
49 112 Jan 6,624 121 6,745 1478 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.03 
50 212 Feb 8,282 120 8,402 1621 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.03 
51 312 Mar 7,036 151 7,187 1385 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.03 
52 412 Apr 7,191 132 7,323 1412 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.03 





54 612 Jun 6,521 99 6,620 1185 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.02 
55 712 Jul 5,507 97 5,604 1043 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.02 
56 812 Aug 5,545 97 5,642 1019 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 
57 912 Sep 5,441 112 5,553 1059 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 
58 1012 Oct 5756 109 5,865 1123 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 
59 1112 Nov 6,562 138 6,700 1122 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 
60 1212 Dec 6,655 131 6,786 1203 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 








Appendix B:  XYZ Oil Company Incident Rates from 2008-2005 
Count ID Month 
Incident 
category in 
rates           
      
Near- Miss 
Rate  Spill Rate 






1 108 Jan 0 9.448224 0 4.724112 4.724112 18.89645 
2 208 Feb 4.724112 0 4.724112 0 0 9.448224 
3 308 Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 408 Apr 0 0 0 3.968254 3.968254 7.936508 
5 508 May 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 608 Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 708 Jul 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 808 Aug 7.936508 3.968254 0 0 0 11.90476 
9 908 Sep 3.968254 0 0 0 0 3.968254 
10 1008 Oct 0 7.936508 0 0 0 7.936508 
11 1108 Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1208 Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total               55.55556 
2009     Nmis Spil Inj Fires Proprt Total 
13 109 Jan 7.936508 0 0 0 3.968254 11.90476 
14 209 Feb 7.936508 3.968254 0 0 3.968254 15.87302 
15 309 Mar 15.87302 0 0 0 0 15.87302 
16 409 Apr 3.968254 0 0 0 0 3.968254 
17 509 May 0 7.936508 3.968254 3.968254 0 15.87302 
18 609 Jun 7.936508 0 0 0 0 7.936508 
19 709 Jul 3.968254 0 0 0 0 3.968254 
20 809 Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 909 Sep 0 0 0 0 3.968254 3.968254 
22 1009 Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1109 Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1209 Dec 0 3.968254 0 0 0 3.968254 
Total               83.33333 
2010     Nmis Spill Inj Fires Propt Total 
25 110 Jan 15.87302 0 0 0 0 15.87302 
26 210 Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 310 Mar 7.936508 11.90476 0 0 0 19.84127 
28 410 Apr 3.968254 0 0 0 0 3.968254 






30 610 Jun 15.87302 0 3.968254 3.968254 0 23.80952 
31 710 Jul 0 15.87302 0 0 7.936508 23.80952 
32 810 Aug 3.968254 0 0 0 0 3.968254 
33 910 Sep 0 3.968254 0 0 0 3.968254 
34 1010 Oct 7.936508 3.968254 0 0 3.968254 15.87302 
35 1110 Nov 15.87302 3.968254 0 0 0 19.84127 
36 1210 Dec 0 7.936508 0 0 0 7.936508 
Total               150.7937 
2011     Nmiss Spill Inj Fires Prop Da Total 
37 111 Jan 3.968254 3.968254 3.968254 0 3.968254 15.87302 
38 211 Feb 0 3.968254 0 0 0 3.968254 
39 311 Mar 0 0 3.968254 0 0 3.968254 
40 411 Apr 3.968254 11.90476 0 0 0 15.87302 
41 511 May 0 0 7.936508 0 0 7.936508 
42 611 Jun 3.968254 3.968254 0 0 0 7.936508 
43 711 Jul 0 3.968254 0 0 0 3.968254 
44 811 Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 911 Sep 11.90476 3.968254 0 0 0 15.87302 
46 1011 Oct 3.968254 3.968254 3.968254 0 0 11.90476 
47 1111 Nov 7.936508 3.968254 0 0 0 11.90476 
48 1211 Dec 0 3.968254 0 0 0 3.968254 
Total               103.1746 
2012     Nmiss Spill Inj Fires Prop Da Total 
49 112 Jan 3.968254 11.90476 0 0 0 15.87302 
50 212 Feb 0 7.936508 0 0 3.968254 11.90476 
51 312 Mar 0 7.936508 3.968254 3.968254 0 15.87302 
52 412 Apr 11.90476 0 0 0 0 11.90476 
53 512 May 0 3.968254 0 0 0 3.968254 
54 612 Jun 3.968254 3.968254 0 0 0 7.936508 
55 712 Jul 0 0 0 0 0 0 
56 812 Aug 0 0 4.376751 0 0 4.376751 
57 912 Sep 0 0 0 2.188375 0 2.188375 
58 1012 Oct 2.188375 0 0 0 0 2.188375 
59 1112 Nov 4.376751 0 2.188375 0 0 6.565126 
60 1212 Dec 4.376751 10.94188 0 0 0 15.31863 
            











Appendix D: Sample of Critical Behaviors Inventory and 
Definitions in XYZ Oil Company 
 
1.0 Body Use and Position 
 
1.1 Line of fire 
    Q.-Does the person place all parts of his/her body so that they will not be pinned, crushed, struck, 
sprayed or   trapped by energy releases of any kind (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, 
moving equipment suspended  loads etc.)? 
Q.-Does the person place all parts of his/her body so that if something gives way, lets go, 
releases, sprays, leaks,  spillage, flashes, arcs, or falls,  he/she will not be contacted  (electrical, 
pneumatic and hydraulic, chemical, suspended loads)?  
    
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Stand to the side or stay out of the area of suspended loads.  
• Hold tool to avoid trapping hand between tool and other object if the tool slips or binds. 
• When using a cutting tool, cut with a motion that is moving away from your body.  
• When accessing or working at height ensures that no items are carried or stored in such a 
way so they may fall or be dropped. 
• When disconnecting hoses, make sure all pressure is relieved. 
• When clearing or cleaning lines, stand to the side. 
• When opening door of pig trap receiver, stand to the side 
• When opening valves, always stay to the side 
• When pouring hot coffee, pour over the top of the counter.  
• When using a paper cutter, make sure that hands and fingers are placed safely away form 
the cutting action of the blade, before lowering the cutting blade. 
• When walking by doors that open out into the hallway, walk on the far side of hallway 
 
1.2 Eyes on path 
Q.-Does the person look in the direction they are walking, moving, or operating mobile equipment or 
vessel? 
Q.-Is the person's vision unobstructed when in motion? 





Q.-Does the person moves at a safe pace appropriate for conditions? 
Q.-Does the person use walkways, stairways and/or catwalks provided for access to working area 
and  
        Avoid shortcuts, uneven, slippery, and cluttered surfaces and areas with tight clearances? 
Q.-Does the person look for hazards in the path below, above and to the sides? 
Q.-Does the person watches above, below and to the sides of where he/she is moving? 
Q.-Does the person walk around slipping/tripping hazards?  
Q.-Does the person clear vision when walking? 
Q.-Does the person use ceiling mirror at intersections where available? 
    
Examples of safe behaviors:  
• When walking, use sidewalks or designated walkways (avoid shortcuts across green 
space or through machinery). 
• When walking on ice, snow covered, wet, oily or slippery surfaces take small flat-footed 
steps. 
• Avoid areas where floor is being cleaned, under construction or repair. 
• Before opening door fully into hallway, partially open door and look both ways 
• Walk down the corridor (instead of running).   
• When walking across your intended path, yield to others. 
• While walking/moving keep eyes on path to avoid bumping objects such as magnetic 




1.3 Eyes on task 
Q.-Does the people keep their eyes on the work being performed?    
Q.-Does the person have an unobstructed view of the work?    
Q.-Does the people ignore distractions while doing the task?   
Q.-Does the people look around for sharp or hot objects, corners, machinery, and equipment.    






Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When using hammer ensures that eyes are focused on striking area.   
• Keep your eyes on the work and pay attention where you place your hands 
• When carrying out task ensures that any distractions are ignored until the job is complete 
or is made safe. 
• If moving large objects such as ladders or poles, check clearances before performing 
tasks 
• When using mechanical lift, identify and avoid overhead obstacles.  
• When working around hot surfaces, keep arms length away. 
• When working in blind spots, visually inspect area prior to placing hands, legs or arms. 
• When reaching into boxes, inspect prior to placing hands inside. 
 
1.4 Working position 
Q.-Does the person stands or sits on level, stable, solid surface that provides good traction?  
Q.-Does the person set up the work on a level, stable, solid surface? 
Q.-Does the person position his/her feet flat and shoulder- width apart? 
Q.-Does the person balance weight equally over both feet? 
         
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When using stool, ladder or climbing device set on level stable surface. 
• Use a step stool rather than a box, chair, etc. and support body with hand on a secured 
object. 
• When setting up ladder, place ladder one foot out for every four feet up. 
• When placing an extension ladder ensures that the ladder is tied off at the top onto secure 
equipment or is extended three feet contact point. 
• When exiting machinery, place feet on level surface. 
 
1.4 Pinch Points 
Q.-Does the person keep fingers, hands, feet, other body parts or the entire body away from tight 
clearances or areas where equipment, machinery pieces or parts come together?  (Primarily 
fingers in tight clearances.) 





Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Keep fingers away from tight areas such as hinges and doors, as they move. 
• Keeping hands from between objects being moved and slings or fixed surfaces.  
• When aligning equipment to work on it ensures that body parts are kept clear of any 
pinch points. 
• Keep hands or fingers out of moving or unstable equipment. 
• When closing drawers, use handles provided.  
• When moving furniture, keep your body away from doors, walls and corners. 




Q.-Does the person use legs and keep back straight when lifting and lowering loads? 
Q.-Is the lifting done in a smooth motion? 
Q.-Is the load held close to the body?  
Q.-Is the weight appropriate for person/s to lift?    
Q.-Is the object secure when lifted? 
Q.-Does the person keeps the load close to body, avoiding extending to arm length and bending 
at waist? 
Q.-Does the person maintain a balanced body position when pushing/pulling? 
Q.-Does the person push instead of pulling when possible? 
Q.-Does the person pulls or pushes with legs instead of back? 
Q.-Does the person "tests" or "sizes up" the load before lifting?  
Q.-Does the person uses a continuous motion instead of "jerking" to pull or push? 
Q.-Does the person pushes with legs and entire body instead of arms only?       
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When lifting or lowering bend at the knees (keeping the back and neck straight) instead 
of bending at the waist  
• Lift heavy objects with two hands and carry load within his/her forearm distance of the 
body. 





• Lift within the safety zone between the knees and shoulders. 
• When moving welding carts, push instead of pull. 
• When pushing pallet jack, keep body balanced and feet square with shoulders. 




Q.-Does the person use stairs, ladders or other climbing devices intended for 
ascending/descending, rather than climbing on equipment, piping, etc? 
Q.-Does the person walk up and down stairs one step at a time using handrails? Do not run on 
stairs. 
Q.-Does the person stands at or below designated top rung on a step stool or ladder? 
Q.-Does the person takes one step at a time instead of skipping stairs or ladder rungs?  
Q.-Does the person keeps the body within the rails of the ladder? 
Q.-Does the person step from truck, machinery, equipment instead of jumping? 
Q.-Are tools secured while ascending and descending? 
       
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When ascending/descending ladders ensures that three-point contact is maintained.  
• When ascending/descending ladders ensures that tools/equipment is not hand-carried. 
• When ascending/descending ensures the person face the ladder. 
• When getting in or out of machinery use the handle.  
• When walking up or down stairs hang on to the hand rail.  
• Place the foot fully on the stair or ladder instead of stepping on the ball of the foot or the 
toes. 
 
1.8 Repetitive motion 
Q.-When exposed to ergonomic risks (static or repetitive work, awkward or forceful work) does 
the person  deliberately break up the stress by changing positions, moving, stopping or rotating 
activity or stretching? 
Q.-Does the person modifies and/or adjusts their equipment or tools to help them achieve neutral 






Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When performing a repetitive task, e.g. tightening of screws, jack hammering, ensures 
that stress is reduced by changing positions, moving or rotating jobs to use different 
muscle groups, taking breaks or stretching.        
• When working at a workstation, (e.g. computer or work-bench), ensures equipment or 
tools are placed in order to achieve neutral or supported body position. 
• When the job requires doing the same motion repeatedly, ensures varying the way the job 
is done, or alternating tasks and or taking regular breaks to rest and stretch. 
 
2.0 Tools and equipment 
 
2.1 Selecting and using proper tools 
Q.-Does the person select the correct tool or equipment for the job?   
Q.-Does the person use the tool/equipment as it was designed to be used?     
Q.-Is the equipment correctly certified for the area in which it is to be used?       
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When opening/closing valve ensures that correct size wheel key is used. 
• When transporting samples ensures that a closed container is used. 
• When appropriate ensures that equipment is correctly certified for the area to be worked 
in. 
• When removing staples, use a staple remover.  
• Never use a wrench for hammer  
• Never use a screwdriver for a chisel or pry bar 
• Follow operating instructions for specialized tools 
 
2.2 Condition of tools 
Q.-Have tools or equipment not been modified?  
Q.-Is there no defective tool in use? 







Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When using power tools, check condition of plugs and cords prior to use. 
• When operating equipment, ensure that guards are in place prior to using. 
• Before using tools/equipment ensure they are free of non-approved modifications. 
• Wire rope slings free of wicker’s / burrs 
• Nylon slings are not excessively soiled or frayed 
• Jaws on wrenches and vises are clean and in good condition. 
 
3.0 Working Environment 
 
3.1 Maintaining housekeeping/proper storage 
Q.-Has the person cleared the area of slipping/tripping hazards?    
    Has the person cleared passages and work area of obstructions and clutter such as boxes, flats, 
pallets, hoses?     
Q.-Does the person clean and organize work area before, during and after the task involved?   
Q.-Has person stored equipment, tools, materials, chemicals securely and labeled chemicals? 
    
Examples of safe behaviors:  
• When slippery surfaces are found ensures that the situation is reported, removed or 
otherwise rectified. 
• Remove oils/chemicals from floors, handrails, etc. 
• Remove debris from floor before leaving area. 
• Wipe up spilled coffee from the floor. 
• Close drawers and cabinets after use.  
• Move boxes, chairs, trashcans, etc. out of the walkway.   
• Keep computer, telephone, and power cords, trash cans, stools and stepladders out of the 
way so they do not become a tripping hazard.  
• When storing equipment in the workplace ensure that it is not stored on stairways, at the 
base of ladder access or in access-ways.  
• Store tools out of the immediate work space when not in use. 
 
3.2 Maintaining barriers and guards 





Q.-Are there barricades and guards in place to prevent entry into temporary hazardous areas?   
Q.-Are barricades and warnings kept around permanent hazards effectively and in good 
condition? 
Q.-Is the correct type of barricade or warning device used? 
Q.-Does the barricade or warning explains the hazard and action to be taken? 
Q.-Is the barricade/warning removed when the hazard is clear? 
    
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When floor gratings have been lifted and are open ensure that "Do not enter" signs and 
chain barricades are in place. 
• When radiography takes place ensure that yellow/black tape and warning triangles are in 
place to prevent unauthorized entry to area. 
• When creating local high noise areas ensure that ear protection signs are erected. 
• Place cones, tape, tents, signs, etc. around temporary hazards (puddles, holes, low 
clearances, overhead work, etc.) 
• When roofing, define buffer zone with tape or rope. 
• Use guards on all belts, couplings, or grinders. 
• When there are spills, wet floors or obstructions to walkways place cones around hazards. 
• When working behind a door that has no window, place a cone in front of the door. 
• When filing in open filing cabinets (that you can't keep closed) place cones in walkway. 
 
4.0 Safety Procedures 
 
4.1 Job planning and hazards analysis  
Q.-Has the person completed the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) for the work being performed   
Q.-Has the person inspected the area for and responding to possible hazards - asking how could I 
get hurt and mitigating that risk?     
Q.-Has the person assess the work area and equipment, reading labels and manuals before 
starting work? 







Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Prior to starting a job, complete a Job Safety Analysis (JSA), involving the right parties. 
• Prior to starting the work, inspect the area for potential hazards. 
• Team consider to review JSA when exposures change  
• Critical tasks that requires a qualified operator to be in the control room during task has 
been identified 
And personnel identified 
• All affected parties are notified of work in progress 
 
4.2 Following Safety work Procedures (Hot work/ Confined Space/ Excavations…) 
Q.-Is the person following Company standard procedures in relation to the task? Safe Practices 
Manual 8.0 
Q.-Is the Person-In-Charge (PIC) helping to ensure that procedures are being adhered to? 
Q.-Has scaffolding been inspected and tagged (green tag) as per SOP 
Q.-Is the person approaching flare in the upwind side?  
Q.-Are compressed gas cylinders away from flammables, with 20feet (6mts) distance?  
Q.-Is the person following all steps established per JSA? 
Q.-Is the person following instructions of the MSDS when handling chemicals although using 
proper gloves? 
Q.-Is the person following established SOP guidelines? 
Q.-has the person verified that confined space is gas-free? 
Q.-Is watch person carrying a radio for communication? 
 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When carrying out any task routine or non-routine, hazardous or not, ensure that persons 
are compliant 
• With company standard operating procedures   
• Ensuring that scaffold is appropriately tagged green and inspection date is updated before 
any task    
• Use of a flare pistol to light all flares and ensuring proper direction of projectile. 





• When doing hot work, ensure that a competent fire watch (second person) is available in 
case of fire and ensure warning signs and shields/curtains are in place. 
• Before entering confined space ensure there is a designated watch person 
• Ensure name is on permit before entering confined space 
• Ensure that all safety equipment is accessible for entrance/exit  
 
4.3 De – Energizing/ Isolating/ Securing Equipment        
Q.-Is the person locking and tagging out equipment he/she is working on with company issued 
lock and Tag? 
Q.-Is the person identifying and isolating all energy sources? This may include cooling hot 
surfaces  
Q.-Is the person locking, tagging, choking, blocking, venting or draining, etc. all energy sources 
before working on or around the equipment? 
Q.-Is the person supporting equipment being mechanically disconnected? 
Q.-Does the person secures all equipment (such as electrical panel) before restarting? 
      
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When removing equipment jams, lock out prior to working on.  
• When cleaning belts and moving parts in equipment, lock out/tag out prior to cleaning. 
Before working on the equipment, verify that the equipment will not start (has been 
isolated) by attempting to start/operate equipment 
• Before working on equipment verify that it will not start (all power sources been isolated) 
by attempting to  
Operate it while isolated as they might other sources of energy. 
4.4 Work Permit in place  
This is more of looking a footprint of a behavior. Observer needs to ask for them. 
Q.-Has the person obtained and displayed approved work permit(s)? 
Q.-Are all required permits on-site, have they appropriate signatures, and are up-to-date? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Use of permits as required by Hot works/ confined space entry/ excavations/ 
• All work permits are duly completed 





4.5 Spill prevention measures in place 
Q.-Is the person following procedures and taking precautions to prevent spills? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When filling tanks or drums keep eye on fill line to ensure that they do not overflow 
• When tanks and vessels sit idle, ensure they are emptied 
• When transferring fluids between tanks, conduct during regular business hours.  
• Has a drip tray available and in use when undoing hydraulic lines. 
 
4.6 Familiar with emergency procedures  
Q.-Has the person received safety briefing upon arrival at platform or new site? 
Q.-Does the person know the muster point of present area of work? 
Q.-Does the person know and understand the emergency phone numbers in camp? 
    Ask him to tell you the numbers- should check: Fire Dept., Medical, Security 
Q.-Has the person inspected the area for possible hazards and how to respond in emergency?  
Q.-Is the person familiar with the site specific emergency procedures?  
Q.-Has the person assess the work area and equipment, reading labels and manuals before 
starting work? 
Q.-Has the person considered the health and environmental aspects in the JHA? 
 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Prior to start a job; complete a Job Safety Analysis (JSA), involving the right parties. 
• Prior to starting the work, inspect the area for potential hazards and look to understand 
how you respond in case of emergency 
• Prior to start a job in an unfamiliar site, inquire for emergency procedures applicable in 
the area 
 
4.7 Communication with co-workers  
Q.-Is the person communicating with co-workers through distinct words or signals, the hazards, 





Q.-Are members of the team within sight so that each can see others actions? 
Q.-Is there a line of communication in place for an employee working alone? 
Q.-Has everyone acknowledged the content of JSA and signed it so that all involved persons 
know the steps? 
Q.-Have changes in JSA been communicated to everybody on the spot? 
    
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• When starting machines or equipment, communicate with all others to ensure your co-
workers are clear of the way. 
• When using mobile equipment, use horn when needed to communicate and alert co-
workers of your presence.  
• When working alone, carry radio to use for communication as necessary. 
• Communicate necessary changes to JSA whenever needed like when exposure changes 
 
5.0  Personal Protective Equipment  
 
5.1 Hand Protection    
Q.-Is the appropriate hand protection being worn for the task? 
Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn correctly? 
  
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear gloves/sleeves made of material designed to protect from the risks of the job. 
• When handling sharp objects wear leather gloves. 
• When pouring or working with chemicals, wear chemical gloves. 
• When welding wear welding gloves and sleeves. 
• When working close to hot surfaces ensures that wrist and other exposed areas are 
protected. 
 
5.2 Eyes and Face Protection    





Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn as designed? 
 
 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear safety glasses with side shields when working in areas with risk of dust, particles, 
etc. in the eyes. 
• Wear face shield and/or goggles where flying particles (e.g., dust, metal shavings, 
splashing hazardous liquids or welding arcs) are generated or when handling corrosive 
chemicals. 
• When welding, use welding hood.  
• When grinding wear goggles. 
• When working with chemicals wear face shield.    
 
5.3 Head / Foot / Body Protection    
Q.-Is head protection being worn in designated areas? 
Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn as designed? 
Q.-Is appropriate foot protection for the job or work area being worn? 
Q.-Is foot protection appropriate for the risk? 
Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn correctly and as designed? 
Q.-Is the appropriate body protection being worn for the task? 
Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn correctly? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear coveralls, apron or other work clothing to protect from the risks of the present job. 
• Wear the appropriate clothing if performing electrical job. 





• Wear steel-toed shoes when working with heavy objects or material handling equipment. 
• When walking on ice, snow-covered and wet surfaces, wear flat (not high heel) shoes 
with slip-resistance soles. 
• Wear boots when handling chemicals. 
• When working in process areas, construction areas, and other designated areas ensures 
that head protection is worn.  
• When head protection is required ensures that it is in good condition and within expiry 
date. 
• Where head protection is required ensures that it is worn correctly. 
 
5.4 Hearing Protection 
Q.-Is hearing protection worn in designated areas? 
Q.-Is it in good condition and cleans? 
Q.-Is it worn correctly and as designed? 
    
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear ear muffs or earplug in areas posted as high noise area.  
• When jack hammering wear ear protection. 
• When working around loud equipment/vehicles wear hearing protection.    
 
5.5 Respiratory Protection 
Q.-Is respiratory protection for the job being worn? 
Q.-Is respiratory protection appropriate for the task being performed? 
Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn properly and as designed? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear recommended respirator where there is risk of inhaling chemicals, corrosives, 
hazardous dust, mist, fumes, or hazardous gases. 
• When working in dusty areas wear dust mask.  
• When wearing respiratory protection ensures that it fits properly, seals against leaks and 
functions as designed. 
• When using breathing apparatus ensures that all safety checks are completed successfully 






5.6 Personal Floatation Device (PFD) 
Q.-Does the person wearing a personal floatation device (PFD) when traveling to and from sites  
    Over water, such as platforms? 
Q.-Is it in good condition? 
Q.-Is it being worn correctly? 
 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear a PFD at all times when on boat, helicopter, or platform. 
 
5.7 Fall Protection  
Q.-Is a person working at height wearing a body harness? 
Q.-Is it attached to a secure mount or secondary device (fall arrestor?) 
Q.-Is the harness, secondary device and mounts in good condition? 
Q.-Does the harness fit correctly? 
Q.-Is it worn correctly? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Wear safety harness when working above 6 feet (either on top of tank, on ladder, etc.) 
• When wearing a lifeline and harness ensures that the lifeline is connected to a secure 
mount. 
• When wearing a harness ensures that it is fit and properly fastened. 
• Maintain the harness free of frays, holes, tears, tape, or modifications. 
 
5.8 Monitor – H2S, multi gas  
Q.-Use during Hot work, confined space or when hazards exist that warrants its use?  






6.0 Crane, Lifting and Rigging  
 
6.1 Rigging and Lifting Techniques Appropriate  
Q.-Is the crane being operated in a slow, smooth and controlled manner, or are the movements 
too fast and jerky causing the load to swing about in the air? 
Q.-Are the people using the rigging gear taking care to use good ergonomics and body posture 
with a good secure footing, or are they stretching too far, or standing on an unsuitable/unstable 
platform such as a box etc.? 
Q.-Is the lay down area is clear from obstruction before the initial lift in made, or are the crew 
trying to clear the area just as the load is about to be lowered? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• The work area is marked with barrier tape. (Where and when appropriate) 
• Operator uses slow deliberate to lift load and slew crane into position  
• Operator uses slow deliberate to lift load and slew crane into position. 
• Operator waits until load has stopped swinging before trying to lower it to the 
deck/ground. 
• The load has tag lines fitted to help control load from spinning during lift. 
• Rigger is using good body posture. 
• The lay down area is discussed and cleared before lift takes place. 
 
6.2 Rigging and Equipment Appropriate  
Q.-Is there enough rigging equipment to complete the task? 
Q.-Is there enough rigging equipment to complete the task? 
Q.-Is the rigging equipment marked with a serial number? 
Q.-Is the rigging equipment marked with a valid color code? 
Q.-Does the rigging equipment have a safe working load suitable for the task? 
Q.-Does the rigging equipment seems to be in good condition? 
Q.-Are there safety latches in the crane blocks or chain hoists? 






Examples of safe behaviors: 
• The rigging equipment is color coded with this years color. (You may need to 
check this with site supervisor to get the color code for the period) 
• Only trained personal using equipment. 
• No non- essential personal near the rigging or lifting operation. 
• Rigging equipment is kept in good condition. 
• Rigging equipment is stored in a suitable location, and in a neat and tidy manner. 
 
6.3 Hand Signals Appropriate 
Q.-Are the hand signals being giving by the Signalman, to the clear crane operator clear? 
Q.-Is there only one person giving the hand signals? 
Q.-Is the signalman wearing a Hi-Viz vest - or some other means of clear identification - to make 
himself visible to the Crane operator? 
6.4 Understand Roles and Responsibilities  
Q.-Is each person involved in the crane or lifting operation aware of their own particular role 
during the operation, and does they what is expected of them? (You may need to ask questions) 
Q.-Is each person involved in the crane or lifting operation aware of their own particular 
responsibility during the operation, and does they what is expected of them? (You may need to 
ask questions) 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Willingness to use the SWA if need be. 
• Inspection of crane by operator prior to lifting operation commencing, and reporting 
defects if any. 
• Inspection of rigging gear by rigger prior to lift, and report defects if present. 
• Ensuring people are kept clear of lifting operation. 
• Setting out a good plan and discuss roles and responsibilities before work begins.  
6.5 Displaying Competencies 
Q.-Are the people involved working with confidence, or do they look confused and bewildered 
by their surroundings? 
Q.-Is the crew working in a controlled manner? 
Q.-Do they answer any questions quickly and confidently, for example a question regarding the  






Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Crane loads moved in a controlled manner. 
• The signalman is using deliberate, clear signals.  
• Good rigging practices being used to sling loads 
• The team is working in a confident manner and able to answer all rigging and lifting 
questions. 
 
6.6 Radio Communication when is required 
Q.-Is the crane lift being carried out a lift were the operator losses sight of the load, if so a radio 
should be used to communicate between crane operator and signalman? 
Q.-Is the radio reception clear and understandable? 
 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Making sure radio batteries are charged. 
• Carrying out radio check prior to lifting operation. 
• Using a headset if noise levels are high. 
 
6.7 Focusing on other duty during the Lift 
Q.-Is the team being distracted by other simultaneous ongoing operations nearby? 
Q. - How are the signalman and rigger doing each other’s duties? 
Q.-Is the crane operator watching the load and signalman directions, or is he watching what’s 
happening on the drill floor etc.? 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Work group is focused on the task in hand. 
• People are adhering to their own specific roles during the lifting operation. 
• Crane operator is vigilant at all times. 
 
6.8 Managing deck-people stay clear of lift area 
Q.-Are there peoples other than the team within the lay down area, or the rigging area whilst a 





Q.-Is there sufficient barriers in place to stop others walking in to the ‘line of fire’ area? 
Q.-Are the signalman and rigger policing the area to keep people clear if no barriers are in place? 
 
Examples of safe behaviors: 
• Use of barriers to keep people out of the lifting area. 
• Inform others of imminent lifting operations. (Can use platform/sites PA system) 
• Try to plan lift during a quieter time of the day. 
• Stopping job and asking someone to leave area if someone enters lift area. 
 
 
6.9 Maintain clearance from overhead power lines  
Q.-Are there any power lines in the near vicinity of the crane lifting operation, if so, is it possible 
for the crane boom, or crane wire rope to come in to contact with them?   
Examples of safe behaviors:  
• Ensure crane can rotate 360deg and still have a 10 foot clearance from the power lines at 
all time. 
• Have a Heavy Equipment or Facility Inspector present to act as spotter. (The spotter can 
leave the site once satisfied that there is enough clearance. 
• Get the power line insolated (tag out/lock out if possible-approved person only)  
• Insulate/shield the power line (approved person only)  
• Install grounding systems for the power lines and make with red flag or tape to aid 
visibility. (Approved person only) 
7.0 Others  
7.1                       enter here any other behavior or Critical Behavior CBI® that is not covered 
above 
 
7.2                        enter here any other behavior or Critical Behavior CBI® that is not covered 
above 
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